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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

As philosophers have devoted more attention to

problems in philosophical psychology and the philosophy
of action,

the concept of choice has been given closer

scrutiny.
The debate surrounding the concept of choice is

focused on two main areas.

First, is choosing funda-

mentally a volition, a decision, or an action?

The

second area concerns the conditions under which an
agent is said to choose.

Issues raised here are the

role and status of alternatives, the nature and role
of deliberation, the concept of commitment, the role
of intention,

and the role of purposes.

of these the question is two-fold.

conditions of choice?

For some

Are they necessary

And if so, what conception of

them is adequate for the concept of choice?
In chapters 2 through 7 I examine various theories,

grouped by type according to what is considered the

fundamental nature of choosing.

In each chapter

I

point out difficulties with the theories being considered and attempt to remedy them.

A number of issues,

however, are relevant to more than one of these chapters.
1

*

2

And some of them require more extensive consideration.
Chapter 8 deals with these issues.

gained in previous chapters,

I

Drawing on insights

present a theory of

choice in chapter 9*
In presenting formal statements of these theories
I

have had to quantify over variables that might not

refer to an existing object.

An agent might believe

he has two alternatives but one of them could be
illusory, such as MacBeth'

s

dagger.

Likewise, when

an agent is considering two alternative courses of

action that he might follow, he might believe he is
capable of performing an action that logically impossible
for him to perform.

Some readers might be disturbed to see such

entities referred to by variables that are bound by

quantifiers.

For those so disturbed I suggest that

they read these quantifiers substitutionally

Chapter 2

CHOOSING AS A VOLITION

If any theory of choice may be called traditional,
it is the view that choosing is a volition.

0.

S.

Franks cites Aristotle as holding that
• • •

ohe act of choice is that act which comes

after deliberation about what is to be done,

and initiates action.

First there is a desire,

then deliberation as to how best to accomplish

what is desired, then comes action.

Choice is

the act which begins the doing of the action.
It is well known that Aristotle like other

Greek philosophers failed to recognize that
there was such a thing as will.

Yet Aristotle

was clearly feeling his way in his account
of action towards the notion of will; in fact,

his account needs to be supplemented merely

by addition.

Choice is indeed the act which

begins the doing of the action, but it is that

because every act of choice is an act of will,
a volition.

In this way it is easy to see where

is the place of choice in moral action; it is,
as the decisive act of will, the beginning of any

3
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moral action, preceded perhaps by preliminary
thinking and deliberation, and also by desire,
but not, like them, a preliminary to action:
choice is the first event in that causally

connected series of events which we call a moral
action, the first member of the action itself. 1

The theory that Franks has outlined in this

passage clearly casts choosing as an act that is the
Initial and initiating portion of a moral action.

A

moral action is a complex series of events the first
of which is this act of choice.

Choosing is a simple act of will, or a volition,
and it is preceded by a desire and deliberation.
is the object of such a choice?

What

Franks notes that

Aristotle employed, though did not explicitly acknowledge, a distinction between choice of ends and choice
of means, and held that

...choice is of means only, never of ends, the

later reducing in his opinion to one, the sole
end of all human action, and being in consequence

fixed for all men and for any man at all times.

The Aristotelian doctrine of choice is of the
choice of means to a fixed end. 2
S. Franks, "Choice", Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society N.S., Vol. XXXIV, 1933-34, P- 271.

2-0.

.

2lbid., p. 271
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The object of an agent's choice is a means
to

achieve an end, or a means to satisfy a desire.

Appar-

ently the object of choice should then be a
course of

action.

Franks refers to Aristotle's view that the

ends of human action collapse into a single fixed
end
for all men at all times.

And he concludes that that

fixed end is the end that all choices of men are

Intended to fulfill.
This view requires further analysis and additional
comments, but we ill defer these until we have clarified
the position expressed in these passages.

Then we will

present a formal statement of the theory and evaluate it.
The conception of moral action underlying this
theory of choice has this form:

For any agent

S,

and any action X, X is a moral

action of S's if and only if there is a Y such
that:

(l) Y is an act

of choice, a volition;

(2) X is a causally connected series of events;

and (3) Y is the first event in X.

In the passages cited above, the volition was designated
"...the first member of the action itself."

I

did not

use the term "member" above because it is not clear how
Franks is using it.

If he understands an action to be

an ordered set of events, then the volition could be

considered the first member.

But he does not employ

set theoretical terminology elsewhere, so we will not
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use the term "member" to express Y's realtion
to X.
Intuitively, the thrust of this theory is that,

under certain conditions, a person chooses to
perform
an action W if and only if he has a volition V
that is
the first event in the causally connected series
of

events that constitutes W.

Let us express it more

formally as (Tl).
(Tl) For any person S and any action W, S chooses

to perform W if and only if there is a B

and there is a V such that:
(1) B is the

end of S and all men;

(2) S deliberates on how to realize B;

(3) W is a causally connected series of events
(

4 ) W is a means of realizing B;

(

5

(

6 ) V is a

(

7 ) V is the first event in W.

)

W is a moral action;

volition of S*s; and

Note that S chooses to perform W, and his choosing
is part of his performance of W.

That is, he chooses tc

perform W by, among other things, beginning the doing of
W.

Again we did not use the term "member" in clause

(

4)

to avoid confusion.

Our formulation of (Tl) does not include any

statement that S actually performs W.

have the volition V and not perform W?
a volition?

Must he?

Can S

Would V still be

What is the realtion between the volition

?

and the rest of the action?

The only indication we get

from these passages is that the volition "...begins the
doing of the action."

We also know that the volition

is causally related to the other events that constitute

the action.

Let us return to the end of one's choice.

Aristotle

might be right. in his contention that there is only one

ultimate fixed end of human action.

But this assertion

does not warrant the conclusion that every instance of

choosing is a choice of means to that single end.

If we

collapse all the ends or purposes of mankind into a
single end, and if we insist that every choice is a
choice of means to that end, we overlook the fact that

many actions chosen as means also serve as ends.

Some-

times the supposed and stated purposes of some agents
are sufficiently transparent that others can see that

they are means to a further end.

But not all of our

choices and purposes are that transparent, even to
ourselves.

Sometimes we seek to fulfill a purpose that

we want to realize in and of itself.

Yet that purpose

would not necessarily qualify as a candidate for
Aristotle's single fixed purpose for all mankind.
One might, for example, desire to become a surgeon.

As a means to reallxe that desire he chooses to attend

medical school.

But to attend medical school he must

complete an undergraduate degree.

And to complete an
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undergraduate degree he must choose to attend
a college,
choose to take the right courses, etc.
On the view
advanced in this theory, choosing to take
the
right

courses is a means to completing the
undergraduate degree, which, in turn, is a means to attending
a medical
school, which is a means to become a surgeon.
On the view advanced in this theory, the
agent*

taking the right courses is a means to his becoming
a
surgeon.

The means-end relation is held to be transitive.

If A is a means to B, and B is a means to C, then
A is a

means to C.

But must we accept this transitivity of

the means-end relationship?

And must we hold that the

final end of each person is the same?
It is questionable that all men are working

toward the same end*

We might be able to generalize

the statement of the end to, say, self-fulfillment, to

make it applicable to all, but then it would be trivially true.

The agreement would be on the use of the

term "self-fulfillment”, but not on its meaning.

The

price paid to achieve unanimity on the term could be to
give the terra a sufficiently general meaning as to allow

such a wide variety of conditions to satisfy it that
it would lack distinctive meaning.

If we assume that all men are working toward
only one overall goal, we shall also fall to recognize

that some of our goals are net seen as means to higher

9

ends.

Consider the would-be surgeon again.

While one

might argue that being a surgeon is a means to self-

fulfillment to him, he could have decided to be a
surgeon just because he wants to be a surgeon.

Then

he would not have chosen it as a means to any other end.
The theory has another fault.

Suppose that the

right hand side of the definition is fulfilled, but in
that state of affairs in which it was fulfilled there was
only one possible means of achieving the end.

Our agent

executed the action, but we could hardly say that he
chose that particular means of realizing the end.

If he

did any choosing at all in that situation, he chose to

realize the end.

So we have a counterexample to this

theory, showing that the definition is too broad.

It

allows actions to be called choices when they are not
choices, because it makes no provision for the require-

ment that the agent chooses among alternatives.

Several points emerge from our discussion.

We

need a clause providing for alternatives for the agent.
But these alternatives need not be truly means to realizing his end.

Even the one he chooses need not be a

means to that end.

All he need do is to believe that

they are means to his end.

The criticism raised against (Tl) thus far call
for a modification like (Tla).
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(Tla) For any person S and any action V, S
chooses

to perform W if and only if there is a B

and there is a V and there is a Y such that:
(1) B is an end of S's;
(2) S deliberates on
(3) S

how to realize

B;

believes W and Y are his alternative

means to realize B;
(

4 ) V is a volition of S’s;

(5) V is the first event in W;
(6) W is a causally connected series of events;
(7)

W is a moral action.

Choosing, according to this theory, is an integral

part of a moral action.

It is the initial and initiating

act that is the first event in a causally connected

series of events that is called a moral action.
ently every moral action involves a choice.

Appar-

But surely

w e cannot accept this identification of choosing and
r

moral action.
Not all instances of choosing are moral actions.

Person S might have a tray of brownies presented to
him.

He considers talcing just brownie A and taking

just brownie B.

He chooses to take just brownie A.

Is this choosing a moral action?

Suppose the tray is

sufficiently full so that there is plenty for everyone.

Then S is not depriving anyone of a brownie.

taking Just brownie A is not immoral.

So his

Perhaps one

and
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who defends (Tla) would maintain that S's not taking
all of the brownies was moral because by not doing so
he did not prevent the others from enjoying their share.
But S did not chooee to not take all of the brownies.

He chose to take Just brownie A.
S's reasons for taking Just brownie A might include

his desire to be sociable, his desire to satisfy his
hunger, or his desire to sample this type of brownie.
But none of these reasons would make his choosing a

moral action.
So it is not all clear that every case of choosing
is a moral action.

Instead of merely asserting this

identification he should have argued for it.
Looking at the theory from the other side, can we
find a counterexample in which a moral action involves
no choice?

We need not work

What is a moral action?

out a rigorous formal statement here, so we shall

speak Just roughly.

Isn't a moral action one for which

we are held responsible?

Isn't a moral action one

which is called 'good' or 'bad'

—

though we would

expect some actions such as 'good shot' from the

category of moral actions?
Let us focus on this aspect of responsibility.

Aren't there actions for which we are held responsible
yet no act of choosing was involved?

On the basis of

the original statement of (Tl), there might not be.

But
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we found that

vre

had to modify (Tl), specifically to

Include the condition that the agent believe that

epecific possible courses of action are his alternatives.

Suppose the agent is not aware of any alternatives, is
not under any pressure to execute the action in question,

but Just does it.

We would hold him responsible, but

no act of choosing was involved.

One who holds (Tla) might object to this counter-

example on the basis that every action involved a

volition or act of will, and that an act of choosing is
an act of will, a volition.

But does this mean that

every act of will, or volition, if an act of choosing?
I

doubt that he could wish to hold that that is the

case.

There is a further problem that this theory must
confront.

Choosing is held to be the initial event

in a causally connected series of events that is a

moral action; and the act of choice is an act of will
or volition.

Suppose one were to execute this act of

choosing, the act of will or volition, but that at some

point along this causally connected series of events,
the series is broken or blocked.

We might ask whether

this is still a moral action and whether our agent can

really be said to have chosen.

We could construct many

counterexamples in which one could choose the means to
achieve his end and yet not realize that end.

Can he
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be said to have chosen?
Two different questions are raised here:

First,

must the conpleted action comprised of the choosing and

carrying out of the means result in the achievement of
the end desired?

The way I have stated it reveals the

answer, which is "No."

The question was essentially

whether the achievement of the end was an integral
part of the completed action, or whether one could

complete the action but fail to achieve the goal.

Neither (Tl) nor (Tla) contains a provision that would
try to guarantee satisfaction of one's puroose or goal,

nor any statement at all about the relation between
the act of choosing, the carrying out of the means

and the achievement of the goal.
treat below.
at hand.

This point we will

But first let us finish with the question

One quick illustration will

shoxtf

that one

can chooGe means to achieve a goal and carry them out

and yet not achieve it.

Suppose

I

am hungry and

choose a hamburger, vis-a-vis a hotdog, and

hamburger.

I

may still be hungry.

three hamburgers are needed.

I

I

eat the

Perhaps two or

So achievement of one's

purpose or goal or end is not one of the required
events in that causally connected series of events
that comprises an action in which one can be said
to have chosen.

The second question is closely related to the
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firet.

If this causally connected series of events

ie broken or blocked, did our agent still
choose?

Both this Question and the previous one are concerned

with what constitutes the fundamental or minimal unit
of action that can be termed a choice.

And both are

raising the point of whether the series of events which
constitutes this unit can be broken or blocked, and
if so, where, without forcing us to deny that the

agent chose.

The issue is complicated by the approach of this

theory which places the act of choice as an integral
part, though only one part, of an action.

And it is

not clear whether it requires that the action be com-

pleted or not.

Our formal statement of (Tl) would

require that the action be completed to satisfy the
right hand side of the definition.
One way around this difficulty would be to reduce

the size of an action unit to the minimum.
I sat down in a restaurant,

Suppose

scanned the menu, and chose

a hamburger as a means to satisfy my hunger.

waitress came to take my order and

I

The

ordered a hamburger.

But she replied that they were all out of hamburger,
and, not being concerned with philosophical distinc-

tions, she added that I would have to choose something
else; I would have to choose again.

If we cast as the action unit my choosing a hamburg,
my ordering a hamburger, and my eating a hamburger,
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the action

1b

Is exhausted.

incomplete, thwarted because the supply
But if we were to restate my original

purpose of satisfying my hunger as eating a
hamburger
(that is, what had been my means is now my
purpose) and

cast my ordering of a hamburger as the means I
execute
to achieve my end of eating a hamburger, we would
have

an action that would be complete and would satisfy
our theory.

Note, though, that the theory satisfied

would be the theory as modified, (Tla) and not (Tl),
for unless we denied the collapsing of ends into one
final end, the string of causally connected events

would be broken when the waitress blocked my eating
of the hamburger by telling me that they had none left.
I

might have then been able to have satisfied my hunger

with a hotdog, but

I

could not have been said to have

chosen a hamburger.
But will this example really satisfy our theory?

What other means did our agent consider?

Going out into

the restaurant kitchen and cooking it himself?
it off the waitress'

customer?

Stealing

tray as she went by to serve another

Within the restaurant he may have considered

no other options.

But we could cast his alternatives

as going to a restaurant and ordering a hamburger,

or going home and cooking a hamburger.

This may seem

minor and peripheral to our central concerns, but

I

point out these problems for cne like these involving
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the description of actions and the individuation
of

events and means will arise every time we attempt
to

portray choosing as an action or as part of an action.
So far we have said little about choosing being
a volition.

Above we pointed out that some volitions

are not choices.

Is every choice a volition?

A volition is the first event in an action, according to this theory.
event of an action?

A if P obtains.

Is every choice the first

Suppose an agent chooses to perform

If P never obtains, the agent will

never perform A.

There is no action, and thus no

volition; but there is a choice.

Franks states that Aristotle did not employ

volition but only because the Greeks had not developed
it.

Yet he adds it because he thinks it will complete

Aristotle's theory as he states it.
Is Franks'

ate?

statement of Aristotle's theory accur-

There are several passages from the Nicomachean

Ethics we should examine.
It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is

voluntary to be an object of choice.

Is it, then,

what has been decided on by previous deliberation?
At any rate choice involves a rational principle

and thought.

1112al3-17

...in general, choice seems to

things that are in our power.

r&ate

to the

llirfc>29
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We choose what ve best know to be
good.

1112a7

The same thing is deliberated upon and
is chosen,
except that the object of choice is already
de-

terminate, since it is that which has been
decided

upon as a result of deliberation that is the object
of choice.

For everyone ceases to inquire how he

is to act when he has brought the moving principle

back to himself and to the ruling part of himself;
for this what chooses.

..

.The object of choice

being one of the things in our own power which
is desired after deliberation, choice will be

deliberate desire of things in our own power;
for when we have decided as a result of delibera-

tion, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.

One important difference between the theory sketched

here and that outlined by Franks is the emphasis on

deliberation.

Franks mentions deliberation as a prelim-

inary to choosing.

But he does not accord it the

postion of importance it has in the passages just
cited.

And he does not spell out the connection between

the agents deliberation and his act of will.

On the theory outlined by Franks it would be

possible for an agent to deliberate, to prefer one
3Arletotle, Nlchomnchca n Ethics Richard McKeon (ed.).
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Wew York: Random
House, 1941 )•
1113a3-l4
.
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alternative, and to follow another course
of action.
Or, the agent might happen to follow
that course of

action he prefers, but Just by chance.
We might think it unusual for an agent to
prefer
one course of action, yet follow another.

If one

chooses A (rather than B), we might want to infer
that
he prefers A to B.

We are certainly warranted in

inferring that it is not the case that he prefers
B to A.

But

vre

should note that a sinrole preference

of A as opposed to B is not sufficient grounds for
a

theory of choice.

One might prefer A to B but

choose neither.
The word 'deliberate' is being used in two ways
here.

We are using it first in the sense of 'intentional'

to shov; that the agent Just did not happen to do

something accidently.

To this Franks might reply that

the act of will required by (Tl) insures that the

action is intentional.

But what connection, then,

is there between the fact that S deliberates and the

fact that S chooses x?

Making S's choosing of x

Intentional will not establish this connection.

This

is a question we shall deal with later.

The other sense in which 'deliberate' is used

here is as a verb, and this is the second point that
emerges from this illustration.

For Aristotle the

process of choosing begins with a desire.

Then the
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agent is confronted with a set of
alternatives that
will serve as a means to satisfy this
desire or achieve
this goal. He then deliberates about
these alternatives
and decides upon one of them. It is this
one that is
the object of his choice.

What is Aristotle's theory of choice?/

Does he

hold that choosing is a volition, and act of
will?
There is some support for this view in the
passages
quoted above.

For Aristotle it is the "moving principle"

in a person that does the deliberating, the
choosing

and the desiring.

And while, as Franks says, he does

not use the term 'will', we could easily add this to

his account and produce the basis for a theory of

choice as an act of will.
The deliberation factor gives this view a different

complexion from that of (Tl), however.
The object of choice being one of the things in
our power which is desired after deliberation,

choice will be deliberate desire of things in our
own power; for when we have decided as a result
of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our

deliberation.^
At the very minimum, deliberation is a preliminary to
any act of choice.

If we read Aristotle this way, we

end up with a theory relatively close to (Tl).
4lbld.

,

I113al2-14.

Aristotle
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epea^s of a "moving principle",
which Franks evidently
considers an analog of the will.
This 'moving principle'
does the deliberating and does the
choosing.
Is the deliberation part of the
choosing?

passage quoted directly above (lll al 2 3
14
this point.

)

i8

The

vague on

Aristotle strongly emphasizes that the

object of choice is decided upon through
deliberation
and is desired after deliberation. If
the deliberation
is not part of the choosing, we have
a theory of choice

that is roughly of this form.
(T2) S chooses X-df (l) x is within
S's power,
(2) S has deliberated on x,
(3) S has
(

decided upon x, and

4 ) S deliberately desires x.

On the other hand, if we take the last oortlon
of

1113 al 2 -l 4

,

"...for when we have decided as a result

of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our delib-

c^&tion

,

as an explanation of why choice is "deliberate

desire of things in our own power"

,

or was what it means

for choice to be deliberate desire, then we have a

theory that is roughly like (T3).
(T3) S chooses x-df (l) x is within S's power,
(2) S deliberates on x
(

3

)

S

decides upon x, and

(4) S deliberately desires x.

As noted above, the element of deliberation, which
is emphasized in (T2) and (T3), is absent from (Tl).
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But in spite of the fact that (T2) and (T3)
share this
emphasis,

(T2) is closer to (Tl) than (T3), for
only

(T3) claims that deliberating and deciding
are port of

the act of choosing.

(Tl) and (T2) can be considered

very generally as theories that view choice as volition
or as an act of will.

But (T3) casts choice as delib-

erating, deciding, and willing.

This difference between (T2) and (T3) is important

for later theories of choice.

We will find that some

later theorists, although unwilling to hold that choosing
is a volition, will hold that choosing is an action,

the carrying out of the means cited in (Tl) and the

acquisition or achievement of that which is desired
in (T2) and (T3).

Others will take the emphasis on

deliberation as their touchstone and claim that choosing
is basically deliberating and deciding.

How well does (T2) stand up against some of the
objections we brought to bear against

(Tl)?.

The formu-

lation of (T2) contains no clause that would affirm the

collapsing of ends into one overall, general end, but
that is the case because we based (T2) on just a short

passage.

Aristotle does affirm in a later passage 4*

(*1113b3-5) that it is the means we deliberate about

and choose, and not ends.

All choosing for him is goal-

directed, wish-satisfying, purposeful.
a goal,

that we wish for, or desire.

We have an end,

This desire
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motivates us to seek a means to satisfy
that desire
or achieve that end.
And it is the means that
we

deliberate about and decide upon and choose.

So (T2),

as an expression of Aristotle's
theory of choice, is

inadequate.

But adding a clause that would express

this dimension of Aristotle's view would
raise some of
the same objections against (T2) that we
raised against
(Tl).

So a completed version of (T2) would
have to be

modified, as (Tl) was, to express the point that
while
we may choose a particular course of action or
object
as a means to another end, the object of our
choice

may be sometimes chosen, in part, as an end in itself.
Our statement of (T2) fares no better than (Tl)

when we raise the question of alternatives.
statement concerning alternatives appears in

No direct
(

T2

)

The emphasis on prior deliberation and decision might

mean for some that the agent had considered other
courses of action.

But these are not specified.

It

is possible for a person to be faced with a situation

in which he correctly believes that he has only one

course of action.
action.

He can consider that course of

He can decide upon it, and he can deliberately

desire it.

But since he never considered or even

believed he had an alternative, we cannot say that he
chose.

Both (T2) and (T3) make clause (l) too strong

by no placing this condition in a belief context.
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Does every case of choosing initiate a moral action
for (T2)?

Again, there is no explicit reference to

moral action in our formulation of (T2), nor is there
any mention of it in the passages on which it is based.

In Book III of De Anlma . Aristotle speaks of
desire as producing movement, and says that sometimes
desire is right and sometimes it is not right.

But we

cannot take this point as grounds for holding that every
movement produced by a desire is a moral action, for at

points it is not clear whether Aristotle is distinguishing
mere bodily movement from behavior.

Desire apparently

can produce movement that is not behavior, such as
instinctive responses.
But (T2) has desire qualified by the term ‘deliberate

Would this restriction yield the result that very action
produced by deliberate desire is a moral action?
Aristotle writes that "we choose what we best know to
be good." 5

And "Hence it is always the object of desire

which produces movement, but this is either the good
or the apparent good; not every good but the practicable

And it is that which can also be otherwise that

good.

is practicable."^ "Every desire too is for the sake of

something; for the object of desire is the starting^Ibid.

,

1112a7.

De Anlma, tr. by D. W. Hamlyn (London:
Oxford, 19^8 , 433&27-30.

^ Aristotle,

)

1

.

Zk

point for the practical intellect, and the
final etep
ie the starting-point of action. "7

These passages to do help to clear up our
confusion.
At one point the object of desire is the
end (i.e., the

starting-point for the practical intellect); at
another
it is the means, that which is the object
of choice.

Since it is not clear whether Aristotle holds
that de-

liberate desire will issue in a moral action, let
us
not claim that for him every case of choosing is
a

part

of a moral action.

Our formulation of (T3) is based on an alternate

reading of the same passages upon which (T2) is based.
As noted above, the major difference between the two

theories is that for (T2) deliberation and deciding
takes place before the choosing, and in (T3

the delib-

eration and the deciding are integral parts of the
choosing.

But, as major as this difference is,

(T3)

will fare almost exactly as (T2) when confronted with the
objections raised against (Tl).
(Tl),

(T 2

),

and (T3) share the central property of

viewing choosing as a volition or as some sort of mental
or psychological impetus to action.

On (Tl), the act

of choosing is the first event in a causally connected

series of events that constitutes an action.
and (T 3

),

On (T2)

choosing is a deliberate desire for that which

?Ibid., 433al5-l6.
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is decided upon.

The last, and perhaps the most crucial question
ve must raise against these theories is ’Is choosing

ever a volition?*

According to (Tl), if one has satis-

fied all of the other conditions, but fails to complete
the causally connected series of events that constitute

that action, the agent has not chosen.

But what then

is the relationship between the act of choosing, which

is the first event in this causally connected series

of events, and the carrying out of the means, which is
the object of choice and another event in this series?

Isn’t this connection contingent?

And wouldn’t it be

possible then to prevent the means from being carried
out and yet have all of the other conditions fulfilled?

But on (Tl) our agent would not have chosen those means.
We noted above, when making the point that a set
of alternatives is required for us to be able to say that
a person has made a choice, that all ve need is to have

the agent believe he has these alternatives open to him.

Apparently (Tl) would then require us to say that if
an agent had three alternatives he believed available to

him, A, B, and C, one of them, the very one he chooses,

must be real

,

must be open.

Note that I did not say that

the agent must know that the one he chooses is really

open to him.

Suppose this agent believed that he had these three
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alternatives, A, B, and C, as possible
routes in a maze
he was to run.
And suppose that C is the route that
will
bring him to the finish. Now suppose he
decides to take
A.
Can we say that he chose A? He would
sey that

he had.

He would try it out, return, and say
that if he wanted
to reach the finish he would have to choose
again.

This illustration shows that we could at least
try to choose something that is not a means.

We would

it a bad choice, because it would not serve
as a

means to the desired goal.

But we would still call it

a choice.

An advocate of (Tl) might argue that A was not a
real alternative in the first place, that only if he had

chosen

C

could we be able to say that he had chosen.

But that response is not satisfying.

that under one of three cups

I

It is like spying

have hidden a oenny.

But

when you choose first one, then the other, of the two that
are not covering the penny, I say that you have not

chosen at all until you have chosen the correct one.
If we were to function on a principle like this, any
one of us could break the bank in ary gambling casino on
any given night.

Perhaps the point

I

am trying to make is better

illustrated by the following story.

visiting me and
thing to drink.

I

Suppose you are

ask you if you would like to have some-

You reply affirmatively and ask me
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what I have.

I

ginger ale; and
checked.

reply that
I

have root beer, coke, and

I

know that

I

have themk for I have Just

You ask for root beer.

But as I am going to

the kitchen to get you some root beer,
my SO n opens the

refrigerator and takes the last one.
late to stop him,

I

I get

there too

return to you and tell you what

happened and tell you to choose again.

Did you choose the first time?/

Certainly the root

beer option was open to you at the time you
replied to
me.

We should not let the fact that the object
of

choice here is phrased as an object disturb us,
whereas
in (Tl) it is an event.
as drinking root beer,

ale.

I

We could have listed the options

drinking coke, and drinking ginger

think that we would say that you did choose the

first time.
We are slowly establishing the fact that choosing

need not be the first event in a causally connected series
of events all of which constitutes an action, for we

can say that our agent has chosen and yet has not com-

pleted the action.
Several pages ago we raised the question whether

choosing is ever a volition.

It is this question that

has been our concern indirectly throughout this chapter

and directly in these last few pages.

The major portion

of this chapter was devoted to showing that choosing is

not identical with a mere volition.

More is needed:
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alternatives, etc.
at all.

And sometimes it is not a volition

In the last few paragraphs we have tried
to

point out some of the problems that arise when
we
say that choosing is sometimes a volition plus
other

factors.

V/e

have not been able to show conclusively by

arguments or by counterexamples that a simple choosing
to perform an action now cannot be considered a volition

plus something else.

Of course, an argument to the

effect that there is no such thing as a volition

would sound the death knell for (Tl) before we had a
chance to point out other defects.

Rather than becoming

sidetracked by the question of the existence or nonexistence of volitions, we chose to see if a viable
theory could be constructed out of those advanced by
others.

Now let us continue to focus our attention on

the concept of choice and see if we can produce a neater
theory, one not so prone to so many problems.

Chapter 3

CHOOSING AS AN ACTION

The first of several papers on the concept of
choice that have been published in the last tv/enty

years was by

J.

L.

Evans. ^

His paper was also the

first to be published after Ryle published The Concent
o£

•

With Ryle's attach of volitions and admission

that choice is an 'authentic process' as a point of

departure, Evans seeks to work out a theory of choice.
Evans takes pains to focus his reader's attention
on the concept of choice with a statement of what he
sees as the general pre-analytical agreement on the

nature of choice and a list of the problems to be
solved.

Choice, it seems agreed, is an activity which

Intervenes between deliberation and action, or

between intention and action, and it is the choosing
which makes the action moral or immoral.

Action

can be Judged as morally good or bad only if it
is chosen.

The following problems, then, seem to remain:
(1) Is choice to be identified with,

for example,

deciding or willing, or are they distinct activities?

1«J.

L. Evans,

If distinct, how are they related?

"Choice", Philosophical Quarterly

pp. 303-315.
29

.

19 55>

30

(

2

)

Is it in fact choice which initiates action?

Or is it desire or willing or a motive?
(3) Is

choosing a momentary act or is it a persis-

tent state?
(

4 ) Do we choose first and then act or do we do

both together?.
(5)

Which is the proper subject of praise and

blame, the choosing or the acting or both?
(

6

)

Do we choose ends as well as means ?^

With that statement as a backdrop, he proceeds to
present a catalog of the senses of the verb 'to choose*

and its cognate verbs.

He sums up his findings as

f ollows

The verb 'to choose', then, is not a verb with a

clear unambiguous use.

It is used, as we have

seen, in many ways which make it approximate some-

times to wishing, sometimes to preferring, sometimes
to willing and sometimes to deciding.

My sugges-

tion is that in its standard use which can be

seen most clearly where it is followed gramatically
by nouns, namely in the simple situation where we
are confronted with two or more alternatives, it
is different from these other verbs.

I

am

suggesting, too, that choice has been misunder2 lbid.,

pp. 305-6.
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stood largely because its standard
use has tended
to be confused with deciding.
This confusion has
especially affected the question of the
relation

between choice and action.

Realizing that deciding

is not to be equated with acting,
moralists have,

through identifying choosing with deciding,
tended
to give a similar account of choosing,
so that
it has become usual to regard choosing and
doing
as two separate, though casually connected,

activities

.3

To further accentuate his point that the view
he
is outlining is confused, he presents a brief
treatment

of the relationship between choice and deliberation.
He is arguing that choosing is not an activity that is

separate and distinct from doing, that "...we do not
first choose and then act."4

According to the general view which

I

am discussing,

the connexion between choice and deliberation

seems to be as follows:

When we are confronted

with a situation where something has to be done
we first deliberate, which involves the consideration
of alternative courses of action, then choose

which action to do and then act.
^Evans, p. 310.

^Evans, p. 311

Thus there are
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three separate though connected acts or
processes,

deliberating, choosing, doing.

Far from clarifying

the notion of action, this account seems
to add

further insoluble problems.

In fact the possibil-

ities with regard to action would aupear to
be
at least these:
(1) We can deliberate and do nothing. .. .Thus
the

statement 'in spite of deliberating for two hours
he failed to choose* can be paraphrased by the

statement 'in spite of deliberating for two hours
he did nothing', while the statement

'in suite of

deliberating for two hours he failed to decide'
cannot be so paraphrased.

This follows from the

point emphasized above that whereas choosing can
be identified with acting, deciding cannot be
so Identified.
(2) We can act without previous deliberation....
(

3

)

We can deliberate and decide to do something

later on, or resolve or make up our mind to do
something later on ....
(4) We can

deliberate and do something, in the

sense that we can consider various possible courses
of action and follow one to the exclusion of the

others.

In such cases we can say that the action

performed was chosen.

There is, of course, no
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need to say that we also decided to do
it

.

Thus Evans maintains "that the verb ’to
choose'

never denotes a separate act ". 6

Since he has already

maintained that in the basic sense of 'to choose'
the verb is followed by a noun that represents
the

object of choice, he is then able to state his
theory
of choice.

Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to talcing
X-rather-than-Y, or to saying that one is taking

X-rather-than-Y.

Similarly where the verb 'to

choose' is followed by infinitives, choosing to
do X is doing X-rather-than-Y, or saying that
one is going to do X-rather-than-Y.
Let us try to put this theory into more formal

language.
(T 4

)

For any person

S,

any object X, S chooses X

if and only if there is a Y such that

X-rather-than-Y, or

S says he is

S

takes

taking

X-rather-than-Y.
For Evans,

(T 4 )

expresses the fundamental sense of the

verb 'to choose'.

Eut sometimes the verb is followed

^Evans, pp. 310-311*
6 Evan 8

,

p.

312.

/Evans, p. 312.
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by infinitives instead of nouns.

In those cases he has

an alternate version of his theory.
(

T4*

Let us call this

)

(T4*) For any nerson S, any action
X, S chooses to

to do X if and only if there is

a

Y such

that S does X-rat her-than-Y, or S savs
that
he is going to do X-rat her-than-Y.

The first thing we should note about Evans
is that while he

’

theory

insists that every case of choosing is

a case of acting, he does not hold that every case
of

acting

is

a case of choosing.

He acknowledges that

there are cases in which an agent acts but does not choose.
In the quotation above, his statement of the theory
is cast as the

conclusion of an argument.

The heart of

the argument is the following:
(1)

Indeed there seems to be no imnortant difference
in meaning between the two statements,

f

vou can

take either the uennv or the bun’ and ’choose

either the -penny or the bun’.

(2)

Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to taking

X-rather-than-Y

,

or to saying that one is

taking X-rather-than-Y.
This argument is neither sound nor valid.
(1)

is false.

First,

There is an imnortant difference between
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the two expressions within the single
quotation marks.
The second is an imperative,
whereas the first is not.
The second does not even have a
truth value, so we can
not even say that they are
truth-functionally equivalent.
This difficulty can be resolved if we
revise the second
statement to read 'you can choose either
the penny or
the bun*.
Then (1) would read as (la):
(la)

Indeed there seems to be no important difference in meaning between the two statements,
f

you can take either the penny or the bun’ and

’you can choose either the penny or the bun’.

We might also revise (1) to read as (lb):
(lb)

Indeed there seems to be no important dif-

ference in meaning between the two statements,
’take either the penny or the bun’ and 'choose

either the penny or the bun’.
Second, does (2) follow from either (la) or (lb)?
The answer is "no”.

Evans has substituted the present

participles "choosing” and "taking" for "you can choose"
and "you can take" respectively.

Why he has done this

he has not said, but it poses no direct problems.

He

also substitutes "-rather-than-" for "either _ or _".
This substitution might pose no problems if he had sub-

stituted uniformly.

But instead of doing so, he collapses

"choosing X-rather-than-Y" to "choosing X".
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If Evans is to be consistent, he
must state the
left hand side of (2) as "choosing
X-rather-t han-Y”
(2)

would then read as (2a):
(2a) Choosing X-rather-than-Y is,
therefore,

equivalent to taking X-rather-than-Y, or
to saying that one is taking X-rather-than-

Y

.

This may seem like

a

small Point, for it seems intuitively

clear that "S chooses X-rather-than-Y” implies
”S chooses
T*

,

but that is beside the point.

they are not identical.

The point is that

If they were identical, Evans’

theory would be in very serious trouble.

We could col-

lapse both sides to form (2b).
(2b)

Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to taking

X or to saying that one

is ta king

X-rather-

than-Y.
Obviously,

(2b)

is not an

Every case of taking would be
is

just plain false.

acceptable theory of choice.
a

case of choosing, which

And Evans states explicitly that he

does not want to hold that to be the case.

So he would

not want to sav that "choosing X-rather-than-Y" is e-

quivalent to "choosing X", or that "taking X-rather-thanY” is equivalent to "taking X”

collapse the other disjunct.

.

Note that we did not

This expression has problems

of its own, and we will explore them later.

But if we
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had collapsed it, we would have
encountered difficulties
similar to those we faced with the
first disjunct.
There is still a further reason why
(2) does not
follow from any version of (1).
(1) is of the form
A is equivalent to B.

Let us say that as

a

result of the substitutions Evans

made A becomes C and B becomes

But from

D.

A is eauivalent to B

Evans then infers something of the form
C is eouivalent to D or E.

Note that (2) contains

a

not.

(2)

So no version of

disjunction whereas (1) does
will follow from (1).

Evans bases his theory, as expressed by
(2), on
the equivalence he claims obtains between "choosing

either A or B

and "taking either A or B"

.

But, as we

noted above, his expression of it in (1) is false.
We advanced (la) and (lb) as versions of (1) that w ere

more acceptable.
A closer examination of (lb) will prove fruitful,
(lb)

is a

statement of the equivalence of two imnera-

tives: "choose either the -Denny or the bun" and "take

either the penny or the bun".

Suppose someone is holding
says, "Take either A or B".

stricnine.

a

But are these eauivalent?

gun on another person and
’A

1

is

cyanide.

*B

f

Is that equivalent to "choose either A

is
cr

B"?
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One might reply that while the
captive is being forced
totake one or the other, he is
given a choice. But the
bolnt is that he is being forced
or compelled.

Can one choose when he is being
forced or compelled?
If he is given no alternative but
to, say, walk the
plank, then he has no choice.
But what if he is Presented
with several possible courses of action
and ordered
to

take one?

At issue is whether an alternative
must be

attractive, or at least not objectionable,
to the agent.
But if we look at our collective experiences
carefully,
we will discover that we have often chosen
the lesser of
two evils.
In these cases, all of our alternatives
are

unattractive or undesirable.

Also at issue is whether we must be free from compulsion in order to choose.

Again, we can cite situations

in which we were under compulsion and chose.

Consider a

context in which the compulsion is not so great or the

alternatives are not so drastic.
is wearing out.

replace the car.

The

engine in my car

am going to have to fix the engine or

I

I

can choose to do either one, but I

am compelled to choose, for

I

need a car.

Those who would object to identifying "take either

A or B" with "choose either A or B" on the basis of com-

pulsion have misunderstood the focal point of the com-
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pulsion.

If you sre ordered, "Tcke A",
you might say
that you have no choice. You
are forced
to

specific action, taking A.
"Take either A or B"

,

nerfo™

a

But if you are ordered,

the focal point of the
compulsion

Is one step removed from
your taking A or your taking B.

You are not being compelled to take A
and you are not
being compelled to take B.
to take one of them.

But you are being compelled

And within the context of this

compulsion you can choose A or you can choose
B.
Thus
we cannot advance freedom from compulsion
as a necessary
condition for choosing.
Those who wish to argue that "take A or
B"

is

not

interchangeable for "choose A or B” might cite
another
type of situation.
Suppose we confront a person with
two different obstacle courses.

He must go through one

or the other to pass a physical examination for a
job
he wants, say, as a forester.

Course A involves swimming

one hundred yards whereas course B requires no swimming

whatsoever.
course B.

The applicant cannot swim.

Did he choose B?

So he takes

Since he could not swim,

he certainly did not see course A as an alternative for

himself.

When he learned that course A required swim-

ming one hundred yards, he would most likely have thought,
"I don’t have any choice but to take course B”.

The
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point is that while "take either A or B"
might be interchangeable for "choose either A or B"
to the one who says
those words, they might not be
interchangeable for the one

confronted by them.

He might take B, thereby satisfying

that command, but he would not
automatically have satisfied the command to choose.

Similar objections can be raised against (la).
pose I say,

Sup-

You can take either the penny or the bun".

,r

The occurrence of the word ’can’ indicates
that

I

see

these as alternatives to you, an important
condition for

choosing.

But you could still renly that you cannot

take the penny, for you cannot see it.

behind the bun.)

(It is hidden

Thus, while you c=n take the bun, you

cannot choose the bun.
Suppose, then, we reformulate (la) to read:
(lc)

Indeed there seems to be no important dif-

ference in meaning between the two statements,
bun

1

*1

and

can take either the penny or the
’I

can choose either the penny or

the bun'
The change in pronoun insures that the one who would be

choosing also sees the options presented to him as alternatives.

The truth of

(

lc

)

seems to depend on the

truth-functional equivalence of "I can take either the
penny or the bun" and "I can choose either the penny
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or the bun" and

loose synonymy ("no important
difference

a

in meaning") between choosing and
taking either one of
the alternatives from among which
one chooses.
How is

"can" used here?

Apparently it is supposed to convey
logical possibility and physical
capability and opportunity
Is

(lc)

true?

be acceptable.

If it is not, no version of
(2) will

Any consideration of the qeustion of

whether choosing means the same as some
tyre of taking,
or taking under a certain s et of conditions,
will force
us to consider (2).

So we will defer treatment

cf

this

problem to our analysis of (2).
In moving from (1) to (2) Evans substituted

rather-than-—

"

for "either

__ or

.

n

-

In the expression

"I can choose either the penny or the bun",
"either

or

—

"

is an

exclusive disjunction.

but not both on the same occasion.
"

-rather-than-

"

I

can choose one

The expression

preserves this exclusion factor,

so there is apparently no difficulty here.
The prime advantage (lc) had over (1), (la) and (lb)

was that it clearly exnressed the fact that the person
doing the choosing and the taking saw the penny and the
,

bun as alternatives.

point?

Does

(2a)

preserve this important
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The expression being analyzed in (2a),

X-rather-than-Y

’

,

’choosing

does preserve this point, because

choosing implies the existence of
alternatives, from
the perspective of the agent, at least.
Does

'taking

X-rather-than-Y’ or ’saying that one is taking
X-ratherthan-Y’ preserve this point? We are
supnosedlv guaranteed at least two objects by both clauses.

But they

need not be alternatives at all.

Suppose you hold our
brownie on it.

I

a

tray to me with only one

take the brownie.

There are manv

other objects in the room— the chair, the table,
the

kitchen sink.

It is true that I took the brownie-rather-

than— the kitchen sink.

But did

I

choose the brcwnie-

rather-than-the kitchen sink?

Of course not.

kitchen sink was not something

I

ternative.

The

considered as an al-

In (2a) we could have any object substituted

for Y, provided it was not identical with the object
taken, and the right hand side of the expression would
be satisfied.

But onlv alternatives would satisfy the

left hand side.
One might object that if we substitute uniformly

throughout the expression we would not be able to substitute for Y any object that would not make the left
hand side true; that is, Y, whater it might be, must
be an alternative to X in the eyes of the person doing
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the choosing.

But that is just the point.

It must be.

And it must be stated so on the right
hand side of the
formula. And I contend that Evans’ theory,
as originally
stated, and as modified, does not contain
this important

Qualification, either explicitly or implicitly.

Evans is apparently reiving on the expression
?

— -rather-than-

’

to perform the function of guaranteeing

that the objects that are

'

n that relation in the formule

are alternatives, and are seen as alternatives
by the a-

gent.

But, as we have seen, it will not do that.

We want to say that

’S

means that S chooses X.

chooses X-rather-than-Y

But we discovered above that

these two expressions are not equivalent.
*

-rather-than-

like
1

’

’

mean?

-instead-of-

-as -opposed -to-

’,
*.

What does

It seems to mean something

or

’

-in-the-place-of-

’

,

or

The implication is that the one

item listed first excludes the one that occurs on the
right hand side of the expression.

It appears to be

relation that is as symmetrical ?nd irreflexive.

a

We

cannot say that ’choosing A-rather-than-B’ is equivalent to ’choosing B-rat her-than-A

rather-than-A

’

’

.

And 'choosing A-

just does not make sense.

But we do need some clause to the effect that these

objects are both seen by the agent as alternatives be-

44
fore him.

So (2a) has to be modified, as (2c).
Choosing X-rather-than-Y is, therefore, e-

(2c)

quivalent to taking X-rather-than-Y, or to

saying that one is taking X-rather-than-Y,
and believing that X and Y are one’s
alter-

natives

.

Supporters of Evans

»

theory might object to (2c)

on the grounds that (2c) has the condition for
alterna-

tives in a belief context.

There is a considerable dif-

ference between having alternatives and believing that
one has alternatives.

And Evans had not even mentioned

the possibility that one might consider something to be

an alternative for him when it was not.

Suppose we had not placed the condition that X
and Y are one’s alternatives in a belief context.

(2c)

still would not have followed from any version of (1),

because there is a disjunction in (2c), as we pointed
out above, that does not occur in any version of (1),

and cannot be derived from

(1)

with the material nro-

vided by Evans.
We must keep the condition concerning the alterna-

tives in
junct.

a

belief context because of that second dis-

’’Saying that one is going to take X-rather-than-

Y” is certainly not interchangeable for ’’taking X-rather-

than-Y”.

One could say that he is going to take X-rather-
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than-Y and then take X-rather-than-Y or
take neither.
He might not be capable of taking either
one, even though
he might believe he was capable of doing
so.
Some might object that sometimes we take
something
by saying we are taking it, such as a player
at

draft session.

a

football

The contention would be that we need this

disjunct to cover these cases.

B u t in a situation like

that, saying that one is taking X-rather-than-Y

X-rather-than-Y.

That is how one does it.

not need the ’’saying

...”

jj?

taking

And we do

disjunct to cover these

cases

Neither (2c) nor any other version of
low from any version of (1).

(2)

will fol-

More important than that

point, though, is the question whether any version of
(2)

will stand up as a theory of choice.

(2c)

is

Let us put

better logical form and examine it more closely.

(2d)

For all oersons S, for all X, for some Y, S
chooses X-rather-than-Y if and only if:
(1)

S takes X-rather-than-Y,

or S says that

he is taking X-rather-than-Y, and
(2)
I

S believes X and Y are his alternatives.

have interpreted ’’eouivalent” in (2c) as "if and only

if", an interpretation that

I

am sure is acceptable to

Eva ns
There are still problems with (2d), however.

Y/e
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have noted above that

»S

chooses X-rather-than-Y

not be taken as equivalent to
to say that

»S

»S

chooses X’.

•

can

Yet we want

chooses X-rather-than-Y’ implies

»S

chooses

X’.

And we definitely want to be able to
say that »S
takes X-rather-than-Y' imolies »S
takes X*.
And these
latter expressions are surely not
equivalent. Evans does
not sive us the machinery we need,
however. Perhans we
can formulate a simrle meaning nostulate
to rerform this
function.

(MPl)For all persons S, for all

X,

if S chooses X-rather-than-Y,

and for some Y,

then S chooses X

and it is not the case that S chooses Y.
The corresponding one for the other pair would be:
(MP2)

For all persons S, for all X, and for some Y
if S takes X-rather-than-Y,

then S takes X

and it is not the case that S chooses Y.
We are still considering (2d).

difficulty of interpreting

when

S

We have resolved the

-rather-than-

*

so that

chooses X-rather-than-Y we have the machinery to

enable us to say that S takes X as well as saying that
S takes X-rather-than-Y.

But in (2d) the exnression we

are analyzing is ”S chooses X-rather-than-Y"

wish to analyze ”S chooses X"
lated (2).

f

.

Yet we

as Evans orignially form-

We made the switch to the longer in an un-

successful attempt to make Evans* argument go through.

Let us restore that portion of (2d) to conform
with
Evans' original statement of (2), which we also
labeled
So (2e),

(TV*.).

(

(2d) 's revision, would also be

(T4e).

T4e) For all persons S, for all X, S chooses X
if and only if there is a v such that:
(1)

S takes X-rather-than-Y, S says
that he

is taking X-rather-than-Y,
(2)

3

believes X and Y are his alternatives.

Will (T4e) stand un?

version of

(2)

and

No.

Earlier we noted that no

would follow from any version of

(1)

be-

cause the disjunction in clause (1) of (T4e) cannot be

produced by the simple substitutions Evans purports to
make.

Again the second disjunct

ficulty.

is

the locus of the dif-

A person could believe that coffee and tea are

his alternatives and say that he is taking cof fee-rather-

than-tea, and lie.

We could not say that he had chosen

coffee
The second disjunct in clause (1) must either be

struck or be revised.
situation in which

a

If we strike it, then the only

nerson can choose bv saying he is

taking X-rather-than-Y is that in which taking X-rather-

than-Y is saying that he

is

taking X-rather-than-Y.

(TAe) modified in this way would be

(T4f).

(TAf)E 0 r all persons S, and for all X, S chooses

X if and only if there

is a

Y such that

ue
(

1

)

(2)

S takes X-rather-than-Y,

and

S believes X and Y are his
alternatives.

We are still not free of difficulties.

Derson believes that he has two alternatives.

Sun^ose a
But then,

without thinking, he takes one-rether-than-t
he other.
He could do this sbsentmindedly or
without realizing
what he had done, or unintentionally. According
,

to

(T4f)

he would have chosen that alternative
which he

took, but we would not want to ssy

chosen.

Choosing is

scious activity.

a

that he had actually

deliberate, intentional and con-

The problem again lies with clause (1)

and is similar to the fault of the second disjunct in
clause (1) of

(

T4e

unintentionally.

)

.

The agent could fulfill clause (1)

He could take A-rat her-than-B and not

mean to do so.
We have dealt thus far only with what Evans considers

the basic form of choosing, where the object of the verb
*

to choose

'

is a

noun.

He states

«

va-riant form of his

theory for those cases where the object of the verb
choose

f

is an infinitive.

f

to

Because it has been many Daces

since I stated this variant,

I

will repeat it here for

ease of reference.

(T4*)For any person S, any action X, S chooses to
do X if and only if there is a Y such that:
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S does X-rat her-t han-Y

,

or S says th^t he is

going to do X-rather-then-Y
This theory will fall rrev to the same
problems as
(t4).

Benefitting from the results of cur exploration

of these problems, we can state

a

revised (T4*), on the

basis of (?4f), as (T4*f).
(

T4 f) For any person S, any action X, S chooses
to do X if and only if there is a Y such that:
(1)

S does X-rat her-t han-Y,

(2)

S believes X and Y are his alternatives.

and

On the positive side, both(T4f) and (T4*f) state the

agent’s belief that he has alternatives.

Both specify

the exclusion of all but one of these alternatives.

And

both spell out the talcing or doing of that alternative
chosen.

When Evans speaks of the object of ’to choose’ as

a

noun, he employs illustrative situations in which the objects referred to by the nouns are real objects.

When we

added the clause on alternatives, we placed them in a belief context.

But clause (1) in (T4f) and (T4*f) and

their predecessors have both alternatives cited occurring
outside a belief context.
Evans does not consider the possibility that either,
But how does one take an il-

or both, might be illusions.

lusion?

On his theory (T4f)

,

the oblect chosen must be
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real.

The object not chosen might have been
an illusion

if the only reference to it occurred
in the belief con-

text.

But clause (1) refers to it as well.

There is certainly no reason why an object
an agent
believes is his alternative, but does not choose,

has to

be real.

If we insist that it be real, then Macbeth

could not choose his sword by taking his sword-rather-

than-his daggar and believing that his sword and his

daggar were his alternatives.
The status of the alternatives in (TA*f) poses

similar difficulties.

Need the alternative action not

chosen be real in the sense that the agent be capable of
performing it at that time?

No.

All he need do is to

believe that he can perform it at that time.

And what

about the action the agent chooses to perform?
he have to be capable of performing it then?

Does

Many

No.

shoppers choose to enter department store doors that are
locked.

They then choose to enter another door.

So

both (T^f) and (T4*f) are defective on this point.
Evans insists that one cannot choose to perform an
But what if someone

action unless he performs it.
chooses to purchase

a

1975 Chevrolet if he likes the

styling and if he can afford

a

ne'*’

car in 1975?

possible for him to make that choice now.

It is

We can view

his alternatives as purchasing a 1975 Chevrolet in 1975
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if one likes the styling; and
purchasing a 1975 Ford in
1975 if one likes the styling.

On the basis of Evans’ theory, however,
one chooses
to purchase a 1975 Chevrolet in 1975 by
purchasing a 1975

Chevrolet in 1975-rat her-than-performing some
other action.
Thus one cannot, on his theory, choose now
to perform an

action in the future, or choose now to perform an
action
if certain conditions obtain.
Evans does not mention any deliberation, or any
de-

cision-making, taking place either before or simultaneously

with the choosing.

He argues that while in some cases

choosing does mean deciding, this is not the basic sense
of ’choose an object’ or ’choose an action’.
W.

D.

Glasgow argues against Evans’ position in his

paper, ”0n Choosing" 8 , maintaining that choosing is mainly

deciding, and that there is an element of commitment in

deciding that the view that choosing is an action lacks.
We will take up Gla show’s position in the next chapter,
but his emphasis on commitment bears consideration in the

light of (T4f) and (T4*f).
Evans is forced to stand on his

-ra ther-than-

’

’

expression when facing charges of ignoring decision and
commitment.

%.

D.

Will that expression bear the weight?

Glasgow, "On Choosing", Analysis

.

Evans

1957, Pp. 135-139.
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would not be disturbed in the least if we
found that decision is not accounted for, because he
holds that choosing is not deciding. To shake Evans'
position, Glasgow
will have to argue successfully that deciding
is

neces-

a

sary condition of choosing,

what about commitment?

It might be argued that the exclusion
characteristic

that

'

— -rather-than-

'

bears is

a

tvne of commitment

and that thus Evans' theory will not fall to
criticisms
of a lack of the commitment factor.

rather-than-

'

means?

Is this what

'

Surely the exclusion character-

istic it bears is the point at which it might be of
help.

But in at least one sense, commitment is not implied by
it at all.

Suppose one is faced with a situation in which

he can do one of two things but not both.
a highway junction,

He might be at

and must turn left or right.

His

turning left excludes the possibility of turning right,
but his turning left -rat her-than-right does not thereby

imply that he was committed to turning left as onnosed
to right.

He might have been confused and bewildered

and turned left just to get our of the way of the traffic

building up behind him.

No commitment would be involved

in his turning left.

Now suppose that after the traveler turned left he
pulled off to the side of the road to study his maps.
He discovers that either direction led to routes to his
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destination,

But which one does he take?

One route

would take him through some scenic villages
he wants to
tour.
The other route would tai^e him onto a
new interstate highway, bypassing the villages.

He glances at

his watch, discovers he is late, eliminates
the village

route, and takes the interstate highway.
The traveler resorted to some deliberation
and de-

cision-making which Evans does not want.

Evans insists

that a decision alone is not a sufficient condition
for

choosing.

But he holds that deciding is not a necessary

condition of choosing either.
What do we do, though, with those instances of choo-

sing that involve deciding, such as this traveler’s case?
If he had not decided, he would not have chosen.
in this case, was necessary for the choosing.

reply that choice is, as he calls it,
concept,

.

.

a

Deciding,

Evans would

"retrospective

(used to) distinguish perplexed from unQ

perplexed activity.”'

Actions which were done after de-

liberation or after consideration of alternatives are
said to have been chosen.
Is

it

possible for a deliberation to be completed

and not result in a decision even though the problem has
been resolved?

^ Evans,

Is

it possible for one to deliberate,

"Choice”, P. 312.
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and act on the basis of his deliberation
(his action is
seen as a result of his deliberation) and
yet to insist
that he never made a decision?

Let us go back: to the traveler deliberating
about
the alternate routes.
The upshot of his deliberation
a choice.

is

He has been deliberating for fifteen minutes.

Suddenly he says, "I am going to travel the interstate-

rather-than-the village route."
we would say that he had chosen.

decision?

On the basis of (T4*)

But isn’t this also a

In both original versions of his theory, where

the object of ’to choose’ is a noun, or an infinitive,

Evans includes

a

clause allowing the agent to choose

merely by saying that he

is going to take

Y, or is going to -perform X-rat her-than-Y.

cases,

I

X-rather-thanIn these

submit, the agent is announcing his choice,

and decision is an important

-part

of his choosing.

10

Nowell-Smith 11 sees this point and builds his theory
around it.

He says that saying that one is going to

10We dropped this clause from (TLe) because one could
say that he is taking X-rather-than-Y and lie.
If,
however, we are able to insert a clause to stipulate
that when an agent chooses X he takes X-rather-thanY and does so intentionally, then we might be able
The agent
to restore the "saying. . ." disjunct.
must not merely intentionally say that say that he
is taking X-rather-than-Y, though; for he could lie
intentionally. He must intend to take X-rather-than-Y.
,

11 P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Choosing,
Analysis
1958, Pd. 63-69.
.

Deciding and Doing”,
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do something is not the same as doing
it.

It is what

he calls the "cold-storage” sense of
"to choose", when

the actual action is delayed to some
future time.

Since

Nowell -Smith discusses this point and incornorates
it
into his theory, we shall defer a full-blown
analysis
of it until we consider his theory in Chanter
6.

We have been examining J

.

L. Evans* theory of choice

as an action, as "taking this-rat her-then-t
hat"

.

We

have found that the formal statement of his theory
needed

many modifications.

There remain

a

few loose ends that

will be dealt with in later chanters.

One of these is

discussed briefly in the paragranh directly nreceding
this.

Another is Glasgow’s point that choosing involves

deliberation, decision and some commitment on the part
of the agent to the object of his choice.

The central

question before us has been "is choosing an action and
only an action?"

And this question will not be finally

resolved until later.
There is yet another theory of choice that casts

choosing as an action that we will examine here.

That

theory is outlined by R chard Taylor in his book Action
;

and Purpose

d

According to Taylor:

^Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

.

(Englewood Cliffs,
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Acting from choice, similarly, is

perfectly com-

a

mon thing, and paradigm cases are easily supplied.
Think of a man, for instance, walking through
the
cafeteria, who pauses before an array of a great

variety of juices then reaches for
ange juice.

a

glass of or-

Here, certainly, is a perfect example

of an act of choice; namely, the actual act, which

consisted of taking one thing from among others
that were offered, and doing so under circumstances
in which those alternatives were,

believed to be, eoually available.

or were at least

No one should

seriously suggest that this man’s choosing was
something accomplished entirely within his mind or
his soul, and that the motions of his hands and

fingers were simply the observable effects of that
inner unobservable episode.

There is no need for

any such inner episode at all.

Had any such thing

occurred--had he said to himself, for instance,
”1 guess I’ll have orange juice this time,” or

something like that

— and

then, before taking it,

tripped and fallen, or been otherwise prevented from

taking the juice, no one would say that he had in
fact chosen the orange juice and that his act of

choice had then failed to produce its normal bodily
effect.

On the contrary, one would only properly
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say that he was about to choose the orange
juice but

was prevented. 13
Let us try to formulate the theory he outlines as
(T5)

.

(T5)

For any nerson S, any X, S chooses X if and

only if there is
(1)

a

Y such that:

S believes that X and

Y are alternatives

that are equally available to him, and
(2) S takes X.

Taylor’s theory will encounter some of the same
problems that Evans’ did.

The absence of such factors

as deliberation, decision,

commitment and intention give

rise to these difficulties.
One oddity of (T5)

is that the terms ’’equally avail-

able” might exclude as instances of choosing some cases

which ere instances of choosing.

The statement of these

cases hinges on the interpretation of ’’equally available”.
The stricter the interpretation, the more flagrant the

counterexample
Let us start with the strictest interpretation.

Sup-

pose a person is to choose between glasses of orange juice,

pineapple juice and grapefruit juice.
be within equal reach
fcr

for him.

The glasses must

If he has to reach farther

one than for the others, then that one would be elim-

13 Taylor, Pp. 76-7
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inated as an alternative.

Now we would not want

theory

a

of choice that is so narrow as to exclude
such an in-

stance as

a

case of choosing.

S 0 "equally available”

must be understood in some ouaH fled sense.

But how?

Taylor evidently wants to avoid the tyre
of situation
in which the agent would have to climb a
mountain
in or-

der to get his Old Milwaukee beer, whereas he
would

merely have to flag
beer.

a

passing canoe to get his Budweiser

He would not consider them equally available.

Yet the makers of Camel cigarettes would have us believe
that someone who prefers Camel would walk a mile for one

rather than take another more easily available brand.
We no not need to stree the fact that the agent must

believe that the alternatives are real.

Whether they

actually are or not, is beside the ooint.
real,

if he could take any one of them,

If they are

but though that

all but one were not available to him, the one he would

take would not be a choice made from all of them.
But Taylor wants the agent to believe that these

alternatives are eaually available to him.

Perhaps he

meant equally possible.

But what do we mean, then, by

degrees of possibility?

We could not mean that all

the alternatives were equally real.

We could not de-

mand that all of them were actually real alternatives
fcr

the agent, for sometimes we do choose only to find

59

later that that one of the supposed
alternatives was
really a blind alley.
The phrase "equally possible alternatives

dundant or mistaken.

,r

is

re-

It seems to imply that one could

be faced with a set of alternatives that were
not e-

ounlly possible.

But if some course of action is an

alternative, it is

a

course of action that is rossible

for that agent to pursue.

A course of action is either

possible or impossible for

a

person to follow.

And if

he sees a course of action as impossible, he does not

see it as an alternative.

Taylor might be trying to exclude the type of situ-

ation in which

a

person is confronted with several pos-

sibilities, but chooses one by eliminating the others
as being too difficult,

or too strenuous; that is, by

dropping them as alternatives.

But isn’t this still

choosing, perhaps negatively, but still choosing?

Cer-

tainly the agent believed that each of these alternatives
was available to him.

But he did not believe that they

were eoually available in the sense of "eoually easy to
carry out".

I

suggest that we dron the word "eoually"

from clause (1) of (T5), for it is either redundant and
not needed, or misleading, or mistaken.
be more acceptable.

So (T5a) would
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(T5a)For any person S, any X, S chooses X
if and
only if there is a Y such that:
(1)

S

believes X and Y are alternatives a-

vailabls
(2)

to him, and

S takes X.

Taylor insists that one’s choosing is not something
that is accomplished entirely within his mind.

He ob-

jects to any view that would cast the motions of an
agent’s

body as simply the observable effects of an inner episode.

But he then insists that "there is no need for any such

inner episode at all.”

Now this latter assertion

the same point as the former.

is not

It is not clear in Taylor’s

text (see auotation above, Pp. 56-7.) whether he believes
that they are the same or whether he holds that the second follows from the first.

The second certainly does

not follow from the first.
By excluding any mental enisode from choosing, Tay-

lor has eliminated decision, commitment and intention

from choosing.

But one can unintentionally or acciden-

tally take one of two alternatives he believes he has,
and,

on Taylor’s theory, thereby choose.

Taylor’s theory also precludes any conditional
choices and any cold-storage choices.

Nowell-Smith

employs the term "cold-storage" to designate the type

6l

of choice where an agent chooses now to
nerform an action
at some time in the future.
Since one has to take that
which he chooses when he chooses it, according
to (T5a)
one cannot choose now to take a vacation
in the mountains
next summer.
On Taylor’s theory, he has not chosen
that
option until he has taken it.
#

Because he casts choosing as taking an object,
there
is an awkwardness to Taylor’s theory when we
speak about

choosing to perform an action.

Evans did not encounter

this difficulty, for he presented an alternate formu-

lation to cover these cases.

But we could easily trans-

late Tavlor’s theory into one which has the -performance
of an action an the object of choice.

that

a

Instead of saying

person chooses the orange juice, we could say that

he chooses to take the orange juice.

Above we noted that Taylor’s theory cannot deal

with the "cold-storage’’ cases of choice because the agent has to take that which he has chosen when he chooses
it.

Now Taylor does not include any time function in

the passage cited.

However, if we were to allow the a-

gent to fulfill the conditions of choosing at different
times, we would be committed to equating taking with

choosing.

It would be possible for a nerson to believe

at time t that he had X and Y as his options.

Then, at
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t*

he could take X.

Without a single time function, we

could say that he had chosen.
But l&ylor insists that when the assent
takes that
which he has chosen, he takes it from among
other objects he believes are his alternatives.
And he insists
that one has not chosen if he decides to
take one from

among several objects he believes are his alternatives,
but is prevented from actually taking it.

Why should such cases be excluded as instances of
choice?

On Taylor’s view where choosing is taking under

certain conditions, an agent certainly has not chosen
if he has not taken that which he chose.

veals

a

But this re-

deficiency in his theory, for sometimes we are

prevented from taking that which we chose.

Occasionally

we choose to enter department store doors that are
locked.

We usually then choose to enter another door.

In equating choosing with taking, Taylor has also

excluded cases of conditional choice.

On the basis of

(T5a) one cannot choose to take X if conditions P ob-

tain.

If conditions P never obtain, then the agent

never takes X.

And by (T5a) he has not chosen.

Yet we

do make such choices.

Taylor’s theory also bars one from choosing principles or purposes.

How does one take

a

principle or
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a purpose?

If we allow him to translate his theory
into

a form similar to the variation provided
by Evans to

cover cases of choosing to perform actions, we
are still
unable to choose principles
How does one perform
.

principle?
choosing

a

a

If we allow him to expand it to say that

principle is the same as choosing to perform

all those actions that one would perform if he held

that principle, then we are back to a problem similar

to that we encountered with "cold-storage” choices.
The agent has not chosen to perform all these actions

until he has performed them.

And he has then not chosen

the principle until he has performed all the appropriate

actions
Perhaps Taylor would wish to allow
to adopt a principle.
or a taking?

a

person to choose

But in what sense is this an action

Isn’t it a decision?

Yet Taylor insists

that choosing is not something that is accomplished en-

tirely within one’s mind.

So he would not allow

a

person

to choose to adopt a principle by deciding to adopt it.

Consenuently

,

it does not appear that a person can choose

to adopt a principle according to (T5) or (T5a)

The genera

1

approach taken by Taylor and Evans

is

to equate choosing with taking, or with performing an

action.

We have found this appraoch to be defective be-

cause it is not flexible enough to deal with
"cold-storage” choice,

conditional choice, and choice of principles

When choosing is identified with taking that object
which
is chosen,

or performing that action which is chosen, the

agent has not chosen until he has taken the object
chosen, or performed the

a

ction chosen.

Thes,

on their

theories, one cannot choose now to take an object later,
or to perform an action later, because their theories

require the agent to take or perform at the same time
he chooses.

Similar difficulties arise with conditional

choices and with choices of principles.
These deficiencies might be avoided with an approach
that places more emphasis on decision, or commitment, or

intention.

In the next chapter we will consider some

theories that attempt to remedy this defect.

Chapter 4

CHOOSING AS A DECISION

On the heels of J. L. Evans' paper came another

paper by W. D. Glasgow 1
.

Glasgow takes issue with Evans'

position that choosing is doing this-rather-than-that
The position that

I

wish to take up in this oaoer

is that while it seems possible in many cases to

substitute for the verb 'to choose* other verbs
such as 'to take* or 'to act', we must not therefore be misled by such language into ssying that

choosing is acting or doing this-rather-than-that.
The moralists,

I

will maintain, are trying to say

something important (however inadequately) when
they make choice an intermediacy between delibera-

tion and action, so putting it on the same logical

level as decision . 2

Glasgow points out that if we were to consider
choosing to be a process, some rather odd statements and
questions vould be acceptable.

The statement "I spent

all the morning choosing a tie", is not itself odd.
But if choosing is a process, one who made such a

statement could be asked, “Are you going on choosing this
afternoon?"

Glasgow attributes the oddity of this

1 W. D. Glasgow.
2

“On Choosing"

Ibid., p. 135*
65

Analysis, 1957, pp. 135139*
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question to the fact that

both the question and the original statement
are
elliptical.

The full version of the statement

might read "I spent all the morning looking at
a
number of ties and trying to choose one of them”.
"this

time X look at the ties, weigh uo their

merits and demerits, and eventually pick up one
and say "I've chosen at last!"

Choosing then is

not a process: it is an upshot of a process.

The characterization of choosing that Glasgow has

outlined here does not seem to be substantially different
from the theory that Evans advanced.

The point of

divergence is elsewhere.
Choosing, then, is an upshot, an upshot which comes

after deliberation on various possible courses of
action.

Evans may well agree with what

so far.

Disagreement begins with the question of the

I

have said

relationship between deliberation, choosing and
acting.

According to Evans there are only two factors

involved in the total situation

—

the deliberating

and the choosing or acting (for the choosing can be

identified with the acting.

Choosing he further

qualifies as "doing this-rather-than-that and not
simply as acting").
^Ibid.

,

pp. 136-7.
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This seems to me to be wrong.

Quite rightly,

stress is laid on the fact that in
choice there
is always an awareness of alternative
courses of
action. But if deliberation on
alternatives is

involved in choice, surely there must
be at some
stage a commitment, that is, a decision
to take

one course of action rather than another.

The

commitment is a commitment to a particular
imperative ("Take the bun") which is an answer to
a

particular question ("Which shall
^he penny

)•

I take

—

the bun

Since commitment is the essence

of choosing, choosing is not identical with the
actual doing this-rather-than-that

:

the relation-

ship between the two is rather one of quasi-

implication.

.

.

Choosing, then, is on the same logical level as
deciding; both are commitments to act, and both

involve fundamentally the same type of mental operation.

Indeed, if this view is not taken, it must

be asked what is the relation between choice and
decision?'

Evans, who believes that there is such

a thing as decision, refuses to assimilate it with

either choice or action, and in his account of the
total process leading from deliberation to action he

ignores it altogether.

His two stages should surely

be three, deliberation, decision and choice of action.
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If a three stage process of this kind
is conceded,
it becomes Just as easy, if not easier,
to assim-

ilate choice to decision rather than action.

Glasgow summarises his position in this way.

Choosing and deciding are on the same logical
level.

But choosing emphasises deliberation about

alternatives: deciding stresses the factor of

commitment (although both commitment and alternatives
are present in either case).

In some cases (e.g.,

where choosing does not involve doing something
immediately

,

or even at all) the difference between

choice and decision is no more than this.

At

other times (particularly in Evans's 'standard'

use) the difference is more marked.

Choosing

then certainly seems often to be used in an 'umbrella'

fashion so as to include the subsequent action
(taking, buying, etc.), and one might mistakenly

think that an action verb alone can be substituted
for it.

To make such a substitution is to leave

out the vital factor of commitment or decision.

This is the essence of my quarrel with Evans.
So the heart of Glasgow's disagreement with Evans
is that Evans'

^Ibid.

,

p.

137.

^Ibid., p. 139*

account of choosing omits commitment or
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decision, a factor which his theory
emohasizes. But he
actually advances two arguments
against Evans. The more
prominent one is based on the contention
that the substitution of action verbs for the verb
'to choose*
is

inadequate.
the

The other is directed at what Evans
calls
'standard' use of the verb 'to choose'.

The first argument can be reconstructed
roughly as
follows.
It is in the form of a reductio ad
absurdum .
(AL

)

(1) S choases B iff 3 takes B-rather-than-C

(Evans'

theory.

(2) If S chooses B,

RAP:

assumption.)

then S is committed to B.

(3) If S takes B-rather-than-C,

committed to B.

then S is

(1,2)

(4) But it is not the case that if S takes

B— rather— than— C , then S is committed to B.
(5) So it is not the case that S chooses B iff
S takes B-rather-than-C.

(2,4)

This formulation of Glasgow's argument is more

complete than any statement he makes.

We should note

that the inference of (5) from (2) and (4) requires an

appeal to a principle like
If (If W, then Y, and it is not the case that if X,

then Y), then it is not the case that W iff X.
Support for (4) can be gained from points we made
in chapter 3 when we considered Evans' theory.

Glasgow's

point is that it is possible for someone to take B-rather-
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than-C in a haphazard, unthinking or
unintentional way.
But choosing B implies being committed
to B, says Glasgow.
Suppose someone held a tray of brownies in
front of
you and said H take one". And you took brownie
B.
It is

true that you took brownie B-rather-than-brownle
C, or
brownie D, etc. But could you say that you were
committed
to B, or to taking B?

Once you reached out and picked

up brownie B, you were committed in the sense in
which a
defensive back in football commits himself: by actually
carrying out one of the options before him.
does not help Glasgow at all.

But this

This interpretation does

more to support Evans than Glasgow.
Glasgow'

8

use of the term Commitment

same as that Just outlined.

‘decision*.

Nov:

is not the

He equates it roughly with

did you make a decision to take brownie B?

Did you deliberate over which one to take?
the largest?

1

Which had the most nuts?

caught in my teeth?

Which one was

Will the nuts get

Which one looks the most fudge-like?

Or, if one is weight-conscious, which is the smallest,

and thus has the least calories?

Sometimes we find

children deliberating In such a manner before taking one
brownie from a tray of them.

But we usually urge them

to "take one, they are all alike".

Most times, though, the brownies are not all alike,
at least in size.

And, on some occasions, when a tray

is thrust in front of us while we are talking to someone
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else, we reach almost without looking at the specific

brownie

,

and.

take one at random*

Other times we do look

at the brownies carefully, and take one deliberately.
01*

these two situations the former is clearly not a case

of choosing.

There is no awareness of alternatives and

the action of taking the brownie is barely more than

mechanical.

But the latter situation would be considered

a case of choosing.

We would be tailing one of a set of

alternatives, knowing, or at least believing, that they

were alternatives, and taking that one deliberately
or intentionally.

Where is the commitment that Glasgow says is

Involved

here?.-

He would say that we had make a commit-

ment when we decided to take brownie B.

A decision

involves a commitment to do what one decides to do.
In this case, the commitment is to take brownie B.
Here is the crux of his disagreement with Evans.

For

Glasgow, choosing brownie B involves a commitment to

take brownie B.

For Evans, choosing brownie B is

identical with taking brownie B (-rather-than-C

)

Now a commitment to take brownie B might be expressed by saying that one is going to take brownie B or
by actually taking brownie B.

exoresses his theory of choice.

This is just how Evans
So choosing brownie

B for Evans is identical with expressing the commitment

to choose brownie B that is entailed by choosing brownie
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B for Glasgow.

I

have made this tortuous comparison

to bring out more vividly the fundamental
disagreement

between them.
What about argument (Al)?

The view of choosing to

which Glasgow is appealing would place the act of
choice
Just prior to the act of expressing one's commitment,

or

the action that would follow as a result of choosing.

Does his appeal to the need for a commitment carry
any

weight?

It does if he interprets

in a very casual sense.

-rather-than-

"

But Evans might maintain that

he was using it in a stronger sense of "B-rather-than-C"
The vocal emphasis one would add in stressing "B" might

express this commitment.

Yet this tack by Evans is

of dubious value, for it will work only for the second

disjunct, which he poses as an alternate way of chocsing,
1-e.,

11

saying that one is going to take B-rather-than-C"

What does one do when one takes B-rather-than-C?
one grasp the brownie more firmly?

and pounce on brownie B?

No,

Does

Lunge for the tray

if Evans is going to

squeeze some element of commitment out of his theory of
choice, he finds it among the properties of the expres-

sion "B-rather-than-C".

And it is not at all clear that

he can do this.

Glasgow

is a bit at odds,

though, to prove that the

concept of choice contains an element of commitment if
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he has to appeal to It In order to
refute Evans' theory.
The only ground he could stand on
would be a pre-analytic
notion of choice, one that he is
trying to clarify by
advancing his theory.

Glasgow does not in this paper present
a formal or
even an informal statement of a theory
of choice.
One

point that

i6

clear is that he wants to maintain that

choice is "an intermediary between
deliberation and
action, so putting it on the same logical
level as
decision. "9

At many points he Indicates his views,

but they do not always seem to refer to one
distinct
theory.

He criticises Evans for neglecting the element

of commitment which he claims is in every
choice.

Let

us lift ou a number of passages that embody a theory of
choice.

Quite rightly, stress is laid on the fact that in

choice there is always an awareness of alternative
courses of action.

But if deliberation on alter-

natives is involved in choice, surely there must
be at some stage a commitment, that is, a decision,
to take one course of action rather than another....

Since commitment is the essence of choosing,

choosing is not Identical with the actual doing
this-rather-than-that
^Glasgow,

11

:

the relationship between the

On Choosing", p. 135 .
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two is rather one of quasi-iraplicat
ion.^®

The theory of choice embodied in this paragraph
can be expressed in the following way.
(T6) For any person S and any course of
action X,
S

chooses X if and only if there is a Y such that

(1) S is aware of X and

Y as alternatives,

(2) S deliberates on X and Y, and
(3) S commits himself to

"take X" or S decides

to take X rather than Y.

We should note that while clause (3) is in the form of
a disjunction, the two disjunct s are identical on his

view.

This is what Glasgow means by

the paragraph just quoted.

*

commitment* in

We will examine this view

below.
On the basis of (T6) "S chooses A" does not imply
"S takes A-rather-than-B"

,

as it would for Evans.

Evans these two statements are identical.
the first "quasi-implles" the second.

For Glasgow

What does he mean

by "quasi-implies" or "quasi-imollcati on" ?
say.

For

He does not

It would seem, though, that he would want to allow

for the possibility of 3 choosing A but not taking A.
If someone chooses to follow a particular course of
action, but then takes no action, we would be apt to

ask whether he had chosen in the first place.

^°Glasgow, "On Choosing", p. 137*

But what
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of the situation In which one is
confronted with many

alternatives?

First he chooses one, and may or may not

begin to follow it up.

Then he chooses another, then

another, until finally he chooses one and
carries it out

completely.

Do we wish to say that he chose only once,

that is, the last time?

Certainly we would become

Impatient with him if we were waiting for him to carry
out that course of action that he had chosen.

We would

be apt to say something like, "Make up your mind".

But

would we say that he had chosen once, or would we say
that he had chosen many times?

right on the heels of another

If one had followed
w*e

would most likely have

said that he had chosen but once.

But if he had started

to follow up the course of action (though not completing
it) or if he had held this commitment more than momen-

tarily, then we might have said that he had chosen many

times.

When one chooses, one begins to follow up the course
of action of his choice but finds it blocked, he tries

again.

That is, he chooses again .

Suppose at a dinner

party on6 is given a choice of coffee or tea.
coffee.

He chooses

He has the cup and saucer in his hand and goes

to add sugar and cream.

more cream.

Then he discovers there is no

But he cannot drink coffee black, so he has

to choose again.

It is for situations like this that I

believe Glasgow holds that the relationship between "S
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chooses A” and "S takes A-rather-than-B"
is one of

"quasi-implication.
Our dinner guest, though, did not expect
to be

thwarted in his choice of coffee.

He fully expected to

be able to drink his coffee as he usually
does
sugar and cream.

—with

So why couldn't we simply add to (T6)

a clause stipulating that one actually carries
out the

course of action chosen unless he is thwarted or
changes
his mind?
In chapters

and 3 we noted that

2

vie

needed a factor

like decision or commitment to make choosing intentional.

Glasgow's theory (T6) supplies this factor of commitment.
He writes
But if deliberation on alternatives is involved
in choice, surely there must be at some stage a

commitment, that is, a decision to take one course
of action rather than another.

The commitment is

a commitment to a particular imperative ("Take the

bun"

)

which is an answer to a particular question

(which shall

I

take

—

the bun or the penny?" )11

Do we commit ourselves to imperatives?

We might

commit ourselves to performing a specific action or to

following a particular policy.

Glasgow views the

Imperative, "Take the bun", as an answer to the question,

"Which shall

I

take

lllbid., p. 137 .

— the

bun or the penny?"

Presumably
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this question is one a person might pose
to himself,

spoken or as a thought.
an imperative?
form,

But why should the answer be

The answer would more likely be of the

"I will take the bun",

an indicative expression of

a thought or an intention.

Glasgow does not spell out what he means by deliberation on alternatives.

Apparently he would accept

the question, "Which shall I take

—

least part of that deliberation.

And we would expect his

X or Y?"

,

as at

decision to be the conclusion of his deliberation.
a decision is not expressed as an imperative.

But

It is

usually a thought expressed by a sentence of the form
I will do A.

When a person poses to himself a question such as

Which shall I take
he is considering alternatives.

— the

bun or the penny?

Glasgow stipulates that

the agent be aware of these alternatives.

In every

illustration he employs the alternatives are real objects.
Yet in his theory he casts the object of choice as a

course of action.

It is unclear whether he holds that

these courses of action are actually open to the agent
or whether he holds that the agent need only believe

he has the opportunity and capability to pursue them.
The definition of commitment employed by Glasgow

in (T6) i 8 quite different from that employed by Nowell-
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Smith and Lyles Brand.

^

It would be possible for me to

choose something, but for others never even
to know I
had done so, even though they were present
when I had
chosen and the object of ray choice either was
present
or was to be executed In that situation.
Commitment for

Glasgow can be purely private and mental.

Nowell-Smith

and Brand do not deny any nrivate or mental characteristics of commitment, but on their views commitment

cannot be private or mental only.
We are going to consider Nowell-Smith’s and Brand's

views more thoroughly later on, so for now we will

present just a rough sketch.

For Nowell-Smith commitment

is not a decision to do this rather than that.

...a private, unannounced decision does not commit

me to anything.

If decisions involve any commit-

ment at all it is not in a full-blooded way,

but in the make-believe way in which premises

made to oneself are binding. ^3
So he disagrees with Glasgow's definition of commitment,

but he does hold with him that commitment
choosing.

is

part of

The "full-blooded" sense of commitment

Nowell-Smith has in mind can come when one oromises
someone else that he will do something or when he takes
12

Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing", Analysis
Myles Brand, "Choosing and Doing", Ratio 1970.
.

^Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing",

n.

65

.

.
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...such steps as to make a certain course of action

inevitable or more nearly inevitable than it was before "14
.

Brand's use of commitment more nearly approximates
Nowell-Smith'

s

second form than his first.

The notion of committing used in condition (iii)
is not tied to announcing a decision of promising.

Basically, it involves taking steps to bring
about a certain outcome. 15

Brand then presents a fromal definition which we will
examine more thoroughly later.
The concepts of commitment advanced by Nowell-Smith

and Brand reveal a deficiency in Glasgow's.

Theirs

emphasize some action that goes beyond a decision, some
tentative beginning attempt to carry out the course
of action chosen.

The lack of any required steos carried out as a

direct result of one's commitment is at the same time
a key weakness in Glasgow's (T 6

).

There is nothing in

(T 6 ) that specifies that a person must do anything

beyond "deciding to do this rather than that" in order
to have chosen.

Glasgow states that the relation between

choosing and action based on, or carrying out, that
choice is one of "quasi-implication".

could then choose and then not act.

^Ibid.

,

p.

64 .

15Brand, p. 90.

Presumably one
But Glasgow never
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spells out clearly what he means by

"

quasl-lmpllcation"

And this omission is a distinct deficiency
with his
theory.

He might disagree with Evans and insist that

choosing is not taking thls-rather-than-that

,

but

since sooner or later we expect to do something that
has a direct bearing on what it is that we choose, he

must make some attempt to spell out the relation between

choosing and acting.
In his paper "The Concept of Choosing" Glasgow

faces this problem more squarely.

He writes,

For me, to choose is to decide to do (take) thls-

rather-than-that and the action implied in the
decision may take place either simultaneously
(as far as one can say) with the decision or

later

Choosing seems to be logically connected with
doing or taking.

..

.Choice therefore involves

two factors necessarily, deliberation about

alternatives and a decision to act.

The action

may take place Immediately or in the future or
not at all.

Unfortunately Glasgow does not face the question squarely

How are choosing and doing logically connected?

enough.

^Glasgow, "The Concept
17lbid.

1

P-

63

of Choosing", Analysis i960, p. 63.
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Curiously enough, Glasgow does concede
a sense of
choosing in which the subsequent action
is included in
the meaning of 'to choose'.

He points out that 'choosing*

is sometimes used as Evans uses it.

It does seem contradictory to say "I
choose tea

rather than coffee, but

I

did not take either"

and therefore, Ev = ns concludes, "it is usually

correct to Identify the choosing with the doing

inasmuch as there is no gap between them".

But

it is possible to argue that the contradiction

arises, not because 'choose' and 'take' can be

identified, but because 'choose' in such a

context is an 'umbrella' word.^

Choosing then certainly seems often to be used in
an 'umbrella'

fashion so as to include the subse-

quent action (taking, buying, etc.), and one might

mistakenly think that an 'action' verb alone can
be substituted for it.

To make such a substitution

is to leave out the vital factor of commitment

or decision. ^9

Nowell-Smith likewise acknowledges this 'umbrella'
sense of 'choose', but both insist that it is not the

fundamental sense.

We will discuss in a later chapter a

^Glasgow, "On Choosing",
19lbid., p. 139 .

p.

138.
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theory advanced by Myles Brand that is an
umbrella-type
theory. At that point we will consider
this approach
more thoroughly.

0.

S.

Franks presents another theory of choice based

on decision in his paper "Choice". 20
Is then decision to or resolving choice?

seems to be that it is.

The answer

Both resolve and choice

have been discovered to precede action, to be among
its preliminaries.

Yet neither initiates action,

nor apparently renders it necessary: neither allows

itself to be identified with volition.

Both

seem to be practical, not theoretical, acts as is

shown by the fact that the distinction of true and
false does not apply to them, while the distinctions
of good and bad, right and wrong, do.

What is

chosen seems to coincide with what is resolved:

both what is chosen and what is resolved are
naturally expressed in words in the same form,
namely to do X.

Lastly both choice and resolve

seem to be about ends and means: ends may be chosen
or resolved upon,

a man can choose or resolve to

do X as a means.

The accounts given of choice

and resolve or decision to agree at all points
20

0.

S.

Franks, "Choice", Proceedings of the
S ociety
N. S., Vol. 3 4» 1933-34*

Aristotelian
pp. 269 - 294
•

.
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and compel the conclusion that the words choice
and resolve are synonymous.

This theory can be cast as (T7).
(T7) For any person S, any action X, S chooses to

do X iff S resolves to do X.

Before we subject (T7) to close analysis, let us examine
Franks* argument that ’choice*

ymous.

and ’resolve’ are synon-

The argument appears to run something like this.

(1)

Both resolving and choosing precede action.

(2)

Neither resolving nor chocsing initiates action.

(3) Neither resolving nor choosing render action

necessary.
(4) Neither resolving nor choosing is identical with

volition.
(5)

Both resolving and choosing are practical (not
theoretical) acts (i.e., neither are true or
false, but are good or bad, right or wrong.

(6)

Both what is chosen and what

is

resolved are

naturally expressed in the same form: 'to do X*.
(7) Thus what is chosen coincides with what is resolved
(8)

Both choosing and resolving are about ends
and means.

(9) Thus

"

choosing" and •'resolving" are synonymous.

Some observations first.

yet it precedes action.
21 Ibid., p. 277

Choice is a practical act, and
How?

If choice is an act, does
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not 'S chooses to do A' express an
action?

Franks apoar-

ently relies on the Identity of
Indiscemibles to infer
( 9 )
from (l) - ( 8 ). But that is risky.
How does he

know that he has accounted for every
property of 'choice'
or 'resolve'?
Franks argues in

(

6

and (7), that since the object

)

of choice and the object of resolve
are both exoressed

in the form,

follow from
of the form,

'to do X',
(

6

).

I

they coincide.

But (?) does not

express my intentions in sentences

"I Intend to do A".

in sentences of the form,

M

I

express my hopes

I

hope to do A"; my wishes

as "I wish to do A H or "I want to do A"; my desires
as "I desire to do A M

.

Does Franks wish to conclude

that my choices are identical with my intentions, my

hopes, my wishes and my desires?

Sometimes they are

identical, but not all the time.

As we have discovered,

choice Involves the selection of one out of a set of
two or more alternatives.

But suppose I have only one

course of action before me, A.

I

can intend to do A,

wish to do A, hope to do A, and desire to do A, but if

A is my only alternative
to do A.

cannot be said to have chosen

So, while (7) might be true in some cases,

it does not follow from
(T 7

I

)

(

6 ).

is quite brief.

Unless one already knows

what Franks means by 'resolve',
on the meaning of 'choice'.

(T 7

)

sheds no light

Let us look at Franks'
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characterization of 'resolve' in the paragraph
quoted
above.

'Resolve' precedes action but does not
initiate

It or render it necessary.

It is a practical act; it

is right or wrong, good or bad, but not
true or false.

A decision is right or wrong, good or bad, and
not
true or false.

But is it an act?

For the moment let

us set aside Franks' equation of 'resolve to'
with

decide to'.
tical act.

To resolve to do X is to execute a orac-

Now to commit oneself to a particular course

of action is, at the very least, to limit one's
options,

perhaps by eliminating some of them, perhaps by taking
steps that will bring one closer to executing that

particular course of action, or to make it more likely
that one will do so.

As an act, a resolve to do some-

thing is a step toward doing it.

Thus far we would not

be remiss in inserting commitment into the definition.

The crucial point is whether one can resolve to do

something, and thus commit himself to doing it, and yet
take no action toward carrying it out.

In one sense

the answer has to be "no", for in resolving to do it he
has already made a move toward carrying out that partic-

ular course of action.

But we are concerned with whether

he must do something beyond that.

A resolve does not initiate action, nor does
render action necessary, according to Franks.
itself a practical act.

it

Yet it is

But it is a preliminary to action,
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and.

there is a definite gap between the preliminary
and

the action itself.

act?

How can Franks call a resolve an

He must hold that it is a mental act.

He insists

that they are good or bad, right or wrong.
We saw in chapter 2 that not every choice is
part
of a moral action.

Franks is not maintaining that

choice is part of a moral action.

He confesses that he

is not quite sure what the relationship is between

choice and moral action.

Curiously enough, Franks never mentions alternatives
or deliberation.

One could deliberate, in the sense of

considering a course of action, and resolve to pursue it,
without considering alternatives.

One's thoughts could

follow these lines:
(1) Consider course of action A.
(2) I believe I can do A.
(3)

A has no bad consequences and is an attractive
thing to do.

(4) I resolve to do A.

But one who had these thoughts could not be said

to have chosen.

He never considers eny alternatives.

Franks' insistence on a gap between resolve and

choice as preliminaries and the action that would serve
as their objects poses a problem not so much because

there is a gap but because he fails to specify what we
can expect to follow from an agent's resolution to do A,
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and the conditions under which we cna expect
it.
He denies that choosing is a volition.

He holds

that we can choose ends as well as means, but
does not
say how.

Thus his theory is defective because he mis-

takenly identifies choosing with resolving, fails to

include reference to alternatives, and neglects to spell
out what we can expect to follow from a person's choice.

R. G. Colllngwood,

in The New Leviathan 22 advances

a theory of choice in which he equates choosing with

deciding.

His thoery is Interesting because he denies

that any preference is involved or that there is any

weighting of the alternatives.
13*1 A man about to choose finds himself aware of
a situation in which alternatives courses of action

are open to him.

It is between these that he chooses.

13*11 I distinguish choice from decision only as
two words which mean nearly enough the same thing
to be left here undistinguished.

13.12 The kind of choice with which

I

am concerned

in this chapter is only one kind; the simplest; mere

choice, or mere decision, uncomplicated by any

reason why it should be made in this way and not
that; in fact, caprice

.

.

.

13.14 Choice is not preference

.

though the words

22 R . G. Colllngwood, The New Leviathan .

University Press, 1942).

(London: Oxford
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are sometimes used as synonyms.

desire

^

.as

Involving alternat Ives

Preference is
.

A man who 'prefers'

to h does not choose at all; he suffers a desire

for

£ and an aversion towrads

b,

and goes where

desire leads him.
13.15 Preference involves a situation where there
are alternatives, but closed alternatives

.

There

are alternatives, for a man who cannot control his

fear of bulls, between walking calmly past this
one's nose and running away, but preference closes
the alternative and forces him to run away.

13.16 Choice presupposes that the alternatives are
open.

A man in a position to choose whether he

shall walk calmly in front of the bull's nose has

open alternatives to choose from (13.1). 2 3

Glasgow had earlier denied that preference was a
necessary condition of choice.

Now we have Colllngwood

Insisting that if there is any preference or any reason
why the agent feels he should choose one alternative

rather than another, then he cannot be said to have chosen/

in the simplest sense of choice.

The theory embodied in the passages just quoted

from Colllngwood can be cast as (T8).

Colllngwood calls

this the simplest sense of choice, caprice.

To distin-

guish it from other senses of choice, we will refer to
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it as (C)choice.
(T8) For any person S, and any action X, S (C)chooses

to do X if and only if there is a Y such that
(1)

Y is an action possible for

S,

(2) X and Y are open alternatives to S,
(3) S does not prefer X to Y and S does not

prefer Y to X,
(4) S has no reason why he should take the course

of action X as opposed to Y, and
(5) S decides to do X.

This theory is quite narrow due to Collingwood'

insistence that whenever one is confronted by a situation
in which he has several alternatives and prefers one more
than the others and takes that one, he has not (C) chosen.
The only type of situation in which one can be said to
have (C)chosen is that in which he does not care which

alternative he takes, but does decide on one.

Does Col-

lingwood mean, too, that we have no reason for doing

X as opposed to not doing X?
We noted earlier that when one is confronted by a
set of alternatives, he sometimes makes his choice

negatively by eliminating them one by one until only one
is left.

But the use of reasons in making choices

is not entirely negative.

positive.

Most of the time they are

Indeed, is not the process of deliberation

a consideration of the alternatives, a search for reasons

why each one would be good, a weighing of the merits of
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each one?

On this view of Collingwood'

b

any delibera-

tion we might do prior to deciding would be
reduced to
mere awareness of the alternatives as
alternatives.
There is a plausibility to this aspect of
Colllng-

wood's theory.

When we search for reasons favoring one

alternative over the others, even in a positive sense,
we are looking for a way to resolve the dilemma
before
us.

Collingwood would say that we are looking for a

way to avoid having to make a (C)choice.

We are looking

for some factor external to ourselves, or for some
excuse, or some reason we can use as justification if

we are called to account for ourselves.

Collingwood does refer to ways in which ’choose’
is used non-capriciously or purposlvely.

But before we

consider them, let us point out some flaws in (T8).
The agent only need believe that he can perform Y in

order for Y to be considered an alternative.

omitted this qualification.

Collingwood

According to (T8) a person

chooses to perform an action by deciding, under certain
conditions, to perform that action.

But what guarantee

do we have that he will perform that action?

He does

not spell out the relationship between choosing and doing.

Collingwood characterizes this type of choice as
caprice.

Suppose one chooses capriciously and another

person asks him why he chose what he chose.

He might

reply that he preferred that course of action to his

alternatives.

Collingwood is mistaken in insisting on
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clause (3) as a condition of capricious choosing.

T0

choose capriciously all one need do is omit any practical reasoning from his deliberation.

Then the

preference he may have had for choosing A, or any other
reason he may have had, did not play a role in any practical inference he made by which he arrived at his
choice.

With caprice there is no practical inference.

Thus we should strike clause (3) and modify clause

(

4)

to read like
(4‘

decision to do X is not the conclusion of

S*

any Inference he makes and he has no reason
/

that guides his choice of X as opposed to Y.
His restriction in clause (l) and clause (2) are

too strong.

The agent need only believe that he can

perform either of his alternatives.
He notes that a voluntary act begins with a decision
to do it (13.8).

This conception of the role of

decision is similar to the concept of volition considered
in chapter 2.

But in paragraphs preceding and following

(13*8) he appears to equate decision with Intention

and allows for one to have an intention without acting
on it.

13.71.

'The will'

is making up your mind, or de-

ciding, to do something;

'the deed is carrying

out that decision.

13.72. When I am conscious of deciding, the de-

ciding

18

the first-order object of my consciousness;
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what I decide to do 1 b a second-order object, an

abstraction from that.
13. 73* Like all abstractions, it is not quite de-

terminate.

To a man making a decision the deed

which he is deciding to do is never completely
definite.

He thinks of it as having certain

characteristics; the rest he leaves to be settled

when it comes to carrying out the decision.
13.85. The development of the process from the will

to the deed involves the progressive conversion of

intention or decision into performance.

There ane

perhaps occasions on which thought turns wholly and

without residue into deed; more often the process
is incomplete, and some of what began as intention
ends as

— what

shall we say?

— frustrated

Intention.

Colllngwood seems to be wavering between holding that
decision is the beginning of the action and holding that
it is a preliminary to a voluntary act.

decision with Intention.

He identifies

But he does not provide the

machinery for distinguishing between a temporally
indefinite occurrent intention and a here and now occurrent intention.

We will spell out this distinction

in chapter 8, drawing on the work of Wilfrid Sellars.

In the meantime, we will be content to say that a
temporally indefinite occurrent intention is a thought
2 4lbid.,

pp. 96-7
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of the form
I

will do A.

A here and now occurrent intention

is

a thought of the form

I will now do A,

which is followed by my doing of A.
•intention

1

Collingwood uses

in both senses without making the distinction.

(T8) would be more acceptable if we specified that we

were using •decides' in the sense of a here and now

occurrent intention.

Then we can expect the agent to

exhibit the appropriate behavior of having a here and

now occurrent intention and doing A if he is capable
of doing it.

The difference between Collingwood'

s

conception

of (C)choice and non-capricious choice is that non-

capricious choice is purposive.
for his non-capricious choice.

An agent has a reason
He might decide to do

something because it is useful, because it is right,
or because it is his duty.

(T9) expresses this sense

of choosing, where "(P) chooses” means "chooses

purposively .
(T9) For any person S and any action X, S (P)

chooses to do X iff there is a Y such that
(1) Y is an action possible for S,
(2)

X and Y are alternatives to S,

(3) S decides to do X because it is useful,

or
8 decides to do X because it is right,

or
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S

decides to do X because it is his duty.

Note that we had to drop clauses
(T8)

.

(

And in clause (2) the word 'open

3
1

)

snd

(

4

)

from

was eliminated.

The agent has a reason for deciding to do X and thus

his alternatives are not open in the sense of unweighted.
(T9) is subject to the same observations and comments

we made on (T8) regarding clauses (l), (2) and (5).

The last theory of choice in which choosing is
cast in some way as deciding is advanced by T. F.

Daveney. 2 5

His theory is that choice is goal-directed

or purposive decision-making.

To sum up, choosing consists in making uo one'e

mind with regard to a particular object, action
or state of affairs, in a context of alternatives,

and the particular choice is made in the light
of best fulfilling some aim or requirement the

agent has in mind

— in

the sense that if the agent

"chose" something, but claimed that no requirement
or aim was fulfilled, we would conclude that he

was either talking nonsense, or concealing his aim.
"Choosing”, Mind, LXXIII 1964 K PP*
in Myles Brand (ed.), The Nature of
Reorinted
515-526.
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
(Glenview,
Human Action
All page references are to
82-90.
Company, 1970), pp.
the reprint in Brand.

25t* F. Daveney,

26ibld., p. 89.

(
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I

am considering his theory with others which cast

choosing as deciding, though he does not wish to equate
choice with decision.
Now, although I think it is true to say that if I

choose an ooject or an action,

I

also decide upon

that object, or decide to do that action, it does
not follow that choice and decision are to be iden-

tified.

The following example makes this clear:

"The instant I awoke, I decided to get up."

That fact that I made up my mind as soon as

I

awoke, shows that my decision did not involve

passing alternatives under review, neither did it
involve a previous state of indecision; yet these

conditions must surely obtain if deliberation
occurs.

In one sense, then, decision is neither

identifiable with choice nor is it necessarily the

product of deliberation. 2 7
(3)

Daveney also lays down some presuppositions for choosing.
(1) There must be alternative courses ooen to

the agent ....
(2) The agent must know that there are alternatives,

and that the embracing of one involves the re-

jection of the others....
1

must believe that the alternatives are possible

of attainment ....
2 ?Ibid.,

p.

88.
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(4) This condition

or requirement.

1

call the condition of aim

It is more easily seen if we

consider cases in which an agent wants something, and considers a number of alternative

means by which his want may be satisfied.

The

particular choice he makes can be seen as a
fulfillment of a prior requirement, and it is
this which guides his choice....
(

5

)

The alternative we choose is always considered
that which suits us best.

I

2^

believe we now have the relevant passages from

Daveney's paper to serve as the foundation for a formal

statement of his theory.

Let us call it

(Tio).

(T10) For any person S, any object, action or

state of affairs X,

S

chooses X iff there

is a Y and there is a Z such that
(1)

Y is an aim or requirement held by

S,

(2) X and Z are alternatives open to S,

(3) S knows that there are alternatives,

and that the embracing of one involves
the rejection of the others,
(4) S believes that he can attain X and S

believes that he can attain

Z,

(5) S considers X as the one that will best

fulfill Y, and
28 Ibid.

,

pp. 83-4*
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(6)

S

makes up his mind to take, do, or

bring about X.
Clause (3) might be cause for some confusion the way
it is stated using Daveney's words.

The confusion is

not entirely due to (3), for the problem arises partly

from (2).

V/hat

is it that the agent knows?

He knows

that embracing one alternative involves rejecting the
others.

It seems to me that the second conjunct is

acceptable.

The first conjunct entails that there are

alternatives, that (2) is true.

But this condition

There are instances that we

makes (T10) too narrow.

would want to call cases of choosing that would be
excluded.

Suppose a traveler is at an intersection in the

highway trying to choose which route he will follow to
his destination.

He examines his map and discovers

He

that both roads at the fork before him lead there.

chooses the one on the left.

Unknown to him, however,

the road to the right is undergoing reconstruction and
a bridge is out of service.

open or real alternative.

Thus that road is not an

He takes the one to the left

and we would say that he chose it.

This situation, however, is not a case of choosing
on the basis of (T10).

Clause (l) is satisfied, for he

has an aim* to get to his destination.
not satisfied.

Clause

(

2

)

is

Although the map and road signs indicate
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that either road will lead to his destination, the
one
to the right is closed.

satisfied, and (4),

The second conjunct of (3) is

(5) and (6) meet with no difficulties.

The traveler believes that both roads are alter-

natives, that both will serve as routes to his destination.
But since the road to the right is closed, and will not

serve as a route to his destination, we cannot say that

he knows that both roads are viable alternatives.
The confusion in the first conjunct of (3) stems

from vagueness in the term 'alternative

8

and a loose

interpretation of the traveler's awareness of the two
roads as alternatives.

By 'alternative* we mean that if

a road is an alternative to the traveler, and if he

chooses an option like the road under repair and concludes, when he finds that it will not do, he chooses
again.

The confusion

I

am pointing to is that an abor-

tive attempt at choosing is sometimes called choosing

by implication when we say ’’choose again".

Yet we

would tend to say that the traveler could not choose
the right hand road on the basis of (T10), and that it

was not an open, vaible alternative.

He only believes

it is an alternative.

If an agent's belief that he has alternatives is

sufficient, clause (2) is too strong.

Yet there are

those with oerfect hindsight who would want to say that
the traveler who chose the left hand road had no choice,
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that he could not have chosen the right
hand road.

If

the traveler tried to choose the right hand
road, such
a person would say

,

"no, you cannot choose this one”.

But he could say this, say, from the position
of a

passenger in the car
was closed.

,

only if he already knew the road

If he, too, approached the intersection

without this knowledge, his response, after the driver

had tried the road to the right and had turned hack,
would most likely have been something like "you should
not have chosen that one", or "you chose the wrong
one.

These situations establish that belief that a

particular course of action is an alternative is an
necessary condition and, together with other conditions,
a sufficient condition for choosing.

So we need to drop clause (2) from (T10).

must also be changed.

Clause (3)

The second conjunct is acceptable

as S knows that the embracing of one alternative involves

the rejection of the others.

The first conjunct,

"S knows that there are alternatives",

is unacceptable,

for it implies that there are real or viable alternatives.
We need to change the operator from 'know'

to

'believe'.

The first conjunct would read "S believes that there are

alternatives"
This revision of the first conjunct of clause (3)
is still inadequate, however.

Suppose one believes that
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there are alternatives.

If he is not conscious of

specific options, his belief is not going to be helpful
at all.

Suppose he believes that A is an alternative,

believes that there are others, but cannot specify
them.

He takes A.

Did he choose?

No,

for he should

have been able to say that in taking A he is rejecting
B or C.

So his belief must be specific enough that he

is aware of particular courses of action as alternatives.

So (T10) needs to be modified to something like (TlOa).

(TlOa) For any person S, any object, action or

state of affairs X, S chooses X iff there
ie a
(1)

I and there

is a Z such that

Y is an aim or requirement held by

(2) S believes

S,

that X and Z are alternatives

to achieve Y,
(3) S knows that embracing one alternative

involves the rejection of the others
(

4

)

S

beleives that he can attain X and

believes that he can attain

S

Z,

(5) S considers X as the one that will best

fulfill Y, and
(6)

S

makes up his mind to take, do, or bring

about X.

Clauses (l) - (5) are the conditions under which one
makes up his mind in this modified version of Daveney's
theory.

Is clause (5) necessary?

V/e

have Just considered
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a theory advanced by Collingwood In
which choosing is

capricious.

If that type of choice is at all viable,

then (5) must be struck.

again in chapter

8

We will consider this point

when we discuss the role of delibera-

tion in choosing.

Another Question that should be raised is whether
all choosing is goal-oriented.

Some of the theories

we have considered list this as one of the conditions
that are necessary if one is to choose.

Most of the

theories considered in this chapter do not incorporate
this element into the context in which one chooses.

This question of whether choosing is necessarily goal-

oriented we will deal with in a later chanter.
The clause that makes Daveney's theory distinctive
is (6).

tical.

He denies that choice and decision are idenHe claims, and rightly so, that there are cases

of deciding that are not cases of choosing.
does he mean by "making up one's mind"?

that comes to mind is "deciding".

But what

The first synonym

He rejects decision

on the grounds that there are cases of deciding without
any deliberation.

But, if we refer to (T10) and (TICa)

again, we will find that clauses (5)>

(u) and (l)

imply some consideration of these alternatives, as

alternatives.

Clause (5), in particular, implies that

some minimal deliberation takes place,

even if it is

only being aware of them as alternatives and seeing one
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of them as obviously the best.

We are not trying to deny that clause
(6) implies
deliberation. It does. But so do (l) (5).
What else,
then, is distinctive about (6) such that
it is more
accurate and adequate than 'deciding'? As
with deciding
there is a difference between 'malting up one's
mind
that
and 'malting up one's mind to
'.
The first

—

•

is very close in meaning to 'decide that'

invol /e some deliberation.
'decide to

—

'.

The second is close to

Daveney never spells out the difference

he sees between 'decide to
to

—

'

and does

'

and 'make up one's mind

and why he prefers the latter, other than that

the first does not require any deliberation.

The

latter does carry with it a strong sense of intention
or commitment to carry out that course of action.

But if I tell you that I have decided to do A, am I
not informing you of my intention to do A.

Daveney objects to equating choice with decision.
But he does not equate it 'making up one's mind'
_s_impliciter .

He spells out a set of conditions that

must obtain as the context within which one makes up

his mind before he will consider him to have chosen.
Why couldn't he do the same for decision?

Why couldn't

he say that while choosing is not Identical with

deciding to slmoliciter

.

choosing is deciding to

in a certain type of context?

Because

I

think that
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li©

could have done so* and that the difference between

'making up one's mind to

'

and 'deciding to

'

is a matter of emphasis not substance, I have considered

his theory to be a version of choosing as deciding.
We should note that while one must make up his

mind under a certain set of conditions in order to be
said to have chosen, he need not try to carry out the
course of action chosen.

On both (T10) and (TlOa) an

agent can choose many times in succession and make

no attempt to carry out his choice.
We might want to allow for changing one's mind,

but if one changes his mind one hundred times before he
begins to carry out any of the courses of action
supposedly chosen, we would demand that he make up his
mind.

We would claim that he had not chosen in those

earlier cases and could tell him that until he commits

himself by beginning to carry out one of the alternatives before him, in our eyes he will not have chosen.

Yet Daveney's theory would serve as Justification for
him.

He could claim that he had made up his mind,

many times of course, but that he had done 60 .
The problem here could be formulated as a question
of whether he is choosing again or changing his choice.

Suppose we are at a dinner party and one guest chooses

tea rather than coffee.

A few moments later he asks

the host if he can switch to coffee.

He is not asking
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to be allowed to choose tea rather than coffee, to be

served the tea and then to be allowed to choose again
and choose coffee rather than tea.

"What

a change in the object of his choice.

he wants is

And if he had

already received the tea, he might ask if he could
trade the tea for some coffee.

The difference here

is that if he were asking to choose again, he would

eventaully have two cups, not one.
The upshot of this discussion is that our choices
are not final until we have carried out a certain amount
of activity we can expect to follow from that choice,
if we are capable of doing so.

Up to that point we

can change our minds, or change the object of our
choice.

Yet since Daveney's theory requires and expects

no action beyond making up one's mind in a certain type
of context, those cases of changing the object of one's

choice become separate cases of choosing.

The theories we examined in this chapter suffer

from a variety of defects.

The fundamental flaw they

share is the failure to spell out the behavior we can
expect from one who has chosen and the relation between

choosing and that appropriate behavior.

Chapter

5

CHOOSING AS SAYING WITH AN INTENTION

R. C.

Skinner, in a paper entitled "Freedom of

Choice" 1 advances a theory of choice that bears
some

similarity to a partion of

<J •

L.

Evans* theory#

The most important condition for making a choice is
the possession of freedom of action .

A person has

freedom of action if, in a particular situation,
there are two or more alternative courses of action,

which he is able to follow.

Two or more courses of

action are alternatives when it is logically
impossible for a person to follow more than one of
them at the same time. 2
Secondly, for making a choice, there must not only

be two or more alternative courses of action,
either of which one is able to follow, but one must
also know, or at least firmly believe, that one is
abl,e

to follow either of them. 1

In a situation, then, where there are two alter-

native courses of action, X and Y, which one is
able to follow, and which one knows, or at least
^R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice", Mind
1963 , pp. 463-48O.

^Ibid.

,

p.

464.

3 lbid.,

p.

465.

105

.

Vol. LXXII,
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firmly believes, that one is able to
follow, one is
able to make a choice between them.
And choosing
to do one of them, X, consists merely
in saying to
oneself, or to another person,

M

I

will do X", with

the intention of doing it.... It is not,
however,

necessary actually to do X, or even to try to
do

it>
A choice can also be made which is not preceded by
a decision that the course of action is best in

the circumstances ... .A person may choose at random,

or hastily or without thinking, or irrationally,

but he still chooses for all that.

All that is

necessary for making a choice is a firm, and correct,

belief at the time one makes one’s choice that
there are two or more alternative courses of action
that one is able to follow; and then one has made
a choice when one says to oneself or to another

person "I will do so-and-so”, with the intention
of doing it .

Before we can present a formal statement of Skinner's
theory we have to deal with some apparent inconsistencies

in the passages Just cited.

Of particular concern is

the status of alternatives.

According to the first pas-

sage, the agent must have at least two alternatives

^Ibid., p. 466.
5 lbid.,

p. 46 9.
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that are viable.

Skinner retreats from such a strong,

narrow position in the second passage by adding
the
qualification that the agent must at least believe
he
can follow either of them. In the third passage
he
combines the first two, requiring "two alternative

courses of action, X and Y, which one is able to follow,
and which one knows, or at least firmly believes, that
one is able to follow...."

But in the fourth passage

he requires "...a firm, and correct, belief ... that
there are two or more alternative courses of action..."

open to him.

Obviously, these four statements are not

equivalent, and we cannot, without inviting problems,

incorporate all four into a formal statement of a theory
of choice.

We saw in the previous chapter that to insist that
each alternative be real

— that

the agent be able to

follow each one through to completion

— is

condition for a viable theory of choice.
drop this one.

too narrow a
So let us

We found no objections to earlier

versions of the second one, so we can consider it as a
candidate.

The third passage contains that objection-

able aspect of the first one, so we will have to discard
it.

The fourth passage does not require that the agent

know that these alternatives are real; it requires
that he believe correctly that two or more alternatives

would be each capable of being carried out.

So we
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must discard the fourth as well.

Thus only the second

Is left.

A further problem

v:e

should look at briefly is the

conception of an alternative outlined in the first
passage.

''Two

or more courses of action are alternatives

when it is logically impossible for a person to follow
more than one of them at the same time."

First, Skinner

should change the logical connective to a biconditional.
Second, on the basis of this definition, a logically

impossible course of action could serve as an alternative.

Suppose I consider going to sleep and drawing

a round square as two courses of action.

It is logically

Impossible for me to do more than one of them at the
same time.

It is logically impossible for me to do

more than one even if I try to do them sequentially,

because one of them is logically impossible period.
Third, his definition is so broad that actions a

person is physically incapable of performing qualify
as alternatives for him.

It is logically possible for

me to run a mile in less than four minutes.

It is

logically oossible for me to swim the English Channel.

And it is logically impossible for me to do more than
one of them at the same time.

These courses of action

are alternatives for me on Skinner*
I am

s

criterion.

But

physically incapable of performing either of them.

Thus it is physically Impossible for me to perform
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either of them.
I

may believe that

I

am capable of performing them,

and not be able to do so, but that is beside the point.
By Skinner's criterion I can believe correctly that

these courses of action are alternatives for me, when
I

am physically incapable of performing either of them.

Note that one may believe that he is physically capable
of performing an action that he is physically incapable
of performing.

The purpose of this definition is to

spell out what the agent believes about these possible
courses of action.

Perhaps Skinner's definition could be modified to
something like this.
(D-A2) Two or more courses of action are alter-

natives to an agent iff it is physically
possible for him to carry out either one
of them and he has the opportunity to carry

out either one of them and it is physically

impossible for him to follow more than one
of them at the same time.

We will try to clarify the concept of an alternative

further in chapter 8, so with this note we will pass
on to consider Skinner's theory.
The heart of his theory in expressed in these lines,
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And choosing to do one of them,

X,

consists merely

in saying to oneself, or to another
person, ”1

will do X", with the intention of doing
it....
It is not, however, necessary actually
to do X,
or even to try to do it.^

We can formulate his theory as (Til).
(Til) For any person S, any course of action X,
S

chooses X iff there is a Y such that
(1) Y is a course of action,

believes X and Y are alternatives for him,

(2)

S

(3)

S says,

(4)

S

"I will do X",

and

has the intention of doing X.

This is the only ulieory I have uncovered in recent oapers

where choosing is linked so closely with an intention.

Choosing has been linked with "deciding to" and "making
up one's mind" but not so far with intention.

Unfortun-

ately, Skinner does not give us the slightest hint as
to how he is using the term 'intention'.

He evidently

would consider as a case of choosing a situation in
which a person satisfied conditions (l) - (4) and yet
did not even try to carry out the course of action he

had chosen.
Suppose the agent has the intention to do X and
has no conflicting intentions.
^Ibid.

,

p

.

466.

Suppose, too, that he

Ill

believes that he has the opportunity
to do X.
grounds can Skinner hold that the agent

On what

need not try

to do X?

If he allows the agent to say, "I
want to do

it, but I will do it sane other
time", what is his

conception of the connection between intention
and action?
Skinner cannot mean that the agent has the
inten-

tion to do X now and need not try to do X.

be untenable.

That would

If an agent believes that he has the

ability and opportunity to do something, and has
the

intention to do it now, we expect him to do it now.

If

he does not do so, or does not try to do so, then we
say that he does not have the intention of doing it

now, or is incapable of doing it.

Trying to do it now

or doing it now is what normally follows having the

intention of doing it now.
It is unfortunate that Skinner added that it was not

even necessary for the agent even to try to do what he

has chosen to do, for the Introduction of the concept
of intention appeared to be promising.

One of the diffi-

culties we encountered with theories of choice based
on decision was that the connection between decision

and action was vague and uncertain.

We could not be

sure once a person decided to follow a certain course
of action that he was actually going to follow it through.

We wanted to allow for the possibility of the agent
to change his mind.

But on the decision-based theories,

changing one's mind often meant choosing again rather
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than changing one*

s

choice*

So one could, choose many

many times and still do nothing.

Before we proceed further we should note a flaw
in (Til) that is related to a problem we discussed
above.

Clause (l) is stated as Skinner spells out his

position in the passages cited.

But in the course of

criticizing his definition of alternative, we noted
that the agent merely has to believe that he has two
or more alternatives.

Skinner wants the agent to firmly

believe and correctly believe that he
either one of them.

is

able to follow

We will grant him all the firmness

in that belief that he desires, but we will not concede
correctness.

The agent could be mistaken.

not be capable of performing either of them.

be logically impossible as well.

He might

Y might

So we will have to

eliminate clause (l).

Skinner holds that one can make a choice without
first deciding that the course of action chosen is the

best in the circumstances.
It is not that he denies that deciding that an

alternative is the best available is related to choosing.
Vihat

he denies is that it is a necessary condition of

choosing.

He distinguishes as three separate activities

“deciding that a particular course of action is best for

you in the circumstances, choosing that course of action,
and actually following it; and being different, ary one
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of these can exist without either of the others. "7
We have already commented on the difficulties

raised by holding that one can choose a particular course
of action but not actually follow it.

And we have

observed that one can choose without first deciding that
that course of action chosen is the best available.

But is it possible to choose without deciding which
one to take?
dom.

Skinner notes that we can choose at ran-

And this would apparently be a case of choosing

without deciding which one to take.

Such a case might

be a situation in which we are offered a chocolate from
a box of identical chocolates.

We look at the choco-

lates and cannot make up our mind which one to take.
So we say, "Oh, I'll just take one at random".
a case of choosing.

This is

But can we say that we did not

decide to choose at random?
Yet for him choosing is saying, "I will do X",

with the intention of doing it.

If we hold that choosing

is deliberate intentional behavior, how can we choose

without thinking?

If we must have an intention to do

that which we choose, how can we choose without thinking?

Perhaps Skinner means "without deliberation", or
"without practical reasoning", instead of "without

thinking".

We raised in a previous chapter this same

question and we will encounter it again in chapter
?Ibid., p. 469.

6.
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He insit s that the agent at least believe that
the

alternatives are available to him.

Can one believe some

thing is an alternative without deliberating?

At the

very least we must be aware of the alternatives as alter
natives.

We must believe that we can carry them out

if we choose them.

All of this involves a certain

amount of conscious consideration of them.

We could

have the experience of having one alternative stand out
as obviously superior to the others without having to

pause and carefully deliberate.

But in order to have

that happen we have to have at least begun to consider
them, even if only for a split second.

This, I believe,

qualifies as minimal deliberation.

Skinner says that w e can choose irrationally.
r

What does he mean by that?

considered irrational?
is irrational?

That the choice itself is

That the process of choosing

How can an intention be irrational?

What Skinner must mean is that the choice is irrational
in that it is foolish, contrary to reason, or is incon-

sistent with the stated aims and purposes of the agent.
It might be a faulty practical inference.
to choose irrationally is to make a bad choice.

Then,

We

all make mistakes, but we don't do them intentionally.
His choice must be intentional on the basis of (Til).

But the irrationality of his choice does not reside

in its intentionality
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Lastly, Skinner holds that a person
must say, to
himself or to another person, "I will do A",
if he is
to choose to do A.
But one's failure to say "I will
do A" should hardly imply that he does not
choose to do
A.

One could choose to do A without saying
anything.

So both clause (3) and clause (4), which
constitute the

heart of (Til) are defective.
As we have seen, Skinner's theory is frought with

problems.

Its main interest to us lies in his use of

intentions as part of the act of choosing.

We will

pick up this strand again in a later chanter.

Chapter

6

CHOICE AS ACTION OH DECISION
In chapter 3 we considered theories that
cast

choice as a type of action.

In chapter 4 we considered

theories that cast choice as a type of decision.

p.

H.

Nowell-Smith wrote a paperl in response to Glasgow*
first paper (which we discussed in chanter
4) advancing
a theory that is a hybrid of these two.

**I

shall main-

tain that the fundamental sense of 'choose* is much

nearer to

'do*

to 'decide*

and that the sense in which it is akin

is secondary . "2

But choice is not an intermediary (between delib-

erating and doing).

For, while deciding to do,

in the paradigm sense, and doing are always two
things, even when doing follows hard on the heads
of deciding, choosing and doing are not always two

things.

Choosing is not

.lust

doing, nor is it

something other than doing and causally connected
to it, it is doing-this-rather-than-that
We can certainly use 'choose*

in cases which involve

no actual (physical or metaphorical) taking or
H. Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing",
Analysis 1953 , pp. 63-69.

^-P.

.

^Ibid., pp. 63-4.
3 lbid.

,

p.

68 .

116

117
or doing.

For example,

have been studying all

I

the advertisements and have now chosen my
new car.

Alternatively
spring).

I

have decided which car to buy (next

Can we then say that in these, the 'cold-

storage' cases,

'choose'

and 'decide' are synonymous?

Perhaps, but I am not sure.
case,

To decide is, in this

still to resolve a doubt or difficulty; and,

in .thi s case

,

the doubt or difficulty happens to

be concerned with choosing a car.
is,

as it happens, a choice*

is also a choice,

So the decision

But when a decision

it is so rather in the way that

a number is (also) the solution to a problem or
a man is (also) a husband.^

Deliberating, deciding, intending
of advising and commanding

— to

— cluster

say nothing

round doing;

they are intelligible only in connection with doing,

if only for the obvious reason that deliberating
is deliberating what to do, and so on.

reason

I

started wi th the deliberative question,

'what shall I do?';

case,

For this

'do'

and in this, the fundamental

and 'choose to do* are synonymous, since

the deliberative form insures the presence of alter-

natives.

From this fundamental sense of 'choose'

it is not difficult to pass in different directions

to the umbrella sense in which it covers more than

^Ibid., pp. 65-6.
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a physical or metaphorical
taking-this-rather-

than-that and to the cold-storage sense in
which
a decision to take this rather than
that is

substituted for an actual taking.

It may be that

this last sense is now the commonest; maybe
not.

In any case it cannot be fundamental since
the idea
of deciding to do this rather than that in
the

future is parasitic on the idea of doing this

rather than that now.^
These passages are the heart of Nowell-Smith’s
paper.
Evans'

The theory he is advancing is a combination of
and Glasgow's.

He considers part of Evans'

theory to be the basic or fundamental sense.

Evans'

theory, we may recall, roughly equated choosing with

taking this-rather-than-that

.

The secondary sense

of 'choose', when the verb was followed by an infinitive, was that of 'doing this-rather-than-that'.
It is this secondary sense that is similar to
Noiirell- Smith' s

fundamental sense.

He does not draw

the distinction between taking and doing that Evans draws.

He does use the term 'take' in the last passage quoted,

but he has already firmly stated that choosing is

basically an action, a doing
is an action too.

Yes.

.

Some may say that taking

But the object of choice for

choosing as taking is an object, whereas the object of
5lbid., p. 67

.
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choice for choosing as doing Is an action.
f ocu8 is on the

Smith.

And the

action not on any object for Nowell-

So his theory will look something like (T12).

(T12) For any person S, any action X, S chooses

X if and only if there is a Y such that
(1) Y is an action,

(2)

and

(a) S does-X-rather-than-Y

or
(b) S decides to do X rather than Y.

First some observations.
of 'choose

1

,

(2a), Nowell-Smith uses hyphens whereas

in the derivative sense,
does not say.

In the fundamental sense

(2b) he does not.

Why?

He

His formulation (2a) also differs from

Evans' derivative sense in that it has one more hyphen.
Evans' version reads "S does X-rather-than-Y"

.

Note,

too, that Nowell-Smith's theory makes no provision for

the agent to choose by saving that he is going to do

X rather than

Y,

as Evans'

does.

Nowell-Smith will

allow (2b) to stand as the meaning for 'choose' only

when the actual action is to take place some time after
the choice (decision) is made.

Again, as we had with Evans, we have difficulties

with alternatives and the expression

"

-rather-than-

We noted in chapter three that it did express the

exclusion of one course of action.

But the course of

action excluded did not have to be an alternative, or
even believed to be an alternative.

So we need to know

that Y is believed to be an alternative.
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Is doing something while believing
one has alter-

natives an instance of choosing?

Glasgow would point

out that there is something missing,
some clause that

would express commitment.
(1) and

He would be satisfied with

(2b) plus a clause qualifying Y as an
alternative.

Roughly, we will find that Nowell-Smith

1

s

theory

falls prey to the problems of the theories
discussed in
chapter 3 if the choice is (l) and (2a), and
the problems
of chapter 4 are his if the choice follows
the path of
(1) and (2b).

We will leave it to the reader to retrace

those steps.
The major difference afforded by Nowell-Smith'
theory, besides the disjunction (2), is the extra

hyphen in (2a).

Does this make more than a visual

difference between his and Evans' theory?

The auxiliary

verb 'does' is now incorporated into one hyphenated
predicate.

I don't

think it does make a substantial

difference.
The appeal of this theory was that perhaps by com-

bining in some way choosing as doing and choosing as
deciding the pitfalls of each would be avoided.

This

hope was not realized, for in the end, Nowell-Smith

holds that 'doing' is the fundamental sense of 'choosing',
and that 'deciding

1

is a derivative sense.

And his use

of the disjunction means that we will have either the

problems of chapter 3 or the problems of chapter 4 ,
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rather than their resolution.

We will have to wait

until a later chapter to consider an
attempt to combine
them more completely.

Chapter

7

CHOOSING- AS A COMPLEX ACTION

The most complex statement of a theory
of choice

that we will consider is advanced by Myles
Brand.

holds that choosing Is an action.

He

But his statement

includes factors that we noted were missing
from Evans’
and Taylor’s theories. His theory, which
we will call
(T13), he numbers (lb) and states it as
follows:

(T13)

(lb) For every person S,

every action

time t, S chose to perform a at

a,
t

and

if and

only if there is an x such that:
(1) x is an action performed by S;

(ii) S's having performed x is identical

with S's having chosen to perform

a;

(iii) S's having performed x is identical

with S's having committed himself to

perform

a;

(iv) at t, S believed that there were alter-

native actions within his power; and
(v) at t,

S

preferred to perform a more

than the alternative actions.
The notion of committing used in condition (iii)
is not tied to announcing a decision or promising.

Basically, it involves taking steps to bring about
a certain outcome.

This sense of 'committing'

is precisely definable in the following manner:
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(Ibl) For every person S and every action

a,,

S

committed himself to perform a if and only if:
(i)

there is a set of actions such that S

performed each of these actions and such
that S justifiably believed that this set
was the total set of requisite actions for

performing

a:

or
(ii) there is a set of actions such that S

would have performed each of these actions
if he had had the opportunity to perform

them and such that

S

justifiably believed

that this set was the total set of requisite

actions for performing

a. 1

This theory is different in many ways from those
of Evans, Taylor, and Nowell-Smith who also hold that

choosing is doing.
tense.

First, Brand states his in the past

He formulates it this way "to indicate clearly

that there is no on-going process of choosing.
are end-stages of processes or activities

Choosings
Second,

Brand includes commitment, belief that there were alternatives within the agent's power, and preference of the
action chosen, whereas the other three do not.
^Myles Brand, "Choosing and Doing", Ratio, Vol. XII,
June 1970, p. 90.
2lbid., p. 86.
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Brand's theory Is initially the most plausible
of
those we have considered.

It seems to have included

the factors the others omitted.

But it is not without

its problems.

First,

(T13) is circular.

Brand has introduced

the expression he is defining in clause (ii).
Second, what happens at time t?
.t?

Does S perform at

do both at t?

Jt

Does S choose at

the action he chose?

Or does he

From Brand's careful statement of his

reasons for using the past tense and from (T13), I

think we can say that he has both in mind.
couldn't an agent choose at

later at

_t

w?

t to

But why

perform an action

People do choose in this way.

This is

the cold-storage sense of choosing outlined by Nowell-

Smith.

Brand holds that choosing is terminal and casts
his theory in the past tense.

One has not chosen,

according to (T13), until he has committed himself to

performing the action he has chosen to perform.

And

by hie definition of commitment, an agent has not

committed himself to performing an action a until he
has performed, or would have performed if he had had
the opportunity, every action he justifiably believed
was requisite for performing action

a,.

One of the conditions of choice, clause (iii) of
(lb), is that S's having performed

2S

is

identical with
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having committed himself to
performing 3.
8 chooses to perform a.
Suppose, too,
8* s

Suppose

that the total

set of actions that S believes
is requisite for per-

forming a is such that S does not
believe he can perform
them and does not perform them.
Thus clause (l) of
Brand's definition of commitment
does not apply.

But

clause (il) does, for he would have
performed them if
he had had the opportunity to do so.
Then, by clause
(lii) and clause (l) of (lb), S has
performed an action
x which is identical with a set of
actions none of which
he has performed. He has done something
which is

identical with nothing he did.

The problem is that

Brand's theory commits him to equating something

categorical

v/ith

something merely hypothetical.

Brand's definition also cannot deal with cases
of choosing at one time to perform an action
at another

time.

time,

Suppose
_t,

_t'

an action

_a

and

,

at

to perform a?

consider three successive points in

v/e

An agent S chooses at

t;*.

t,*.

At

_t'

can

v/e

a,

at t.

a,

And since

Jfc.

performing a is requisite for performing

(ibl-i).

to perform

say that S has chosen

He did not perform a at

committed himself to performing

t,

a,,

S has

not

on the basis of

Suppose that he had the opportunity to perform

Since he did not do so he has not committed

himself to performing

a,

according to (ibl-li) either.

Some might object to this criticism and point out
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that S did not merely choose to perform a; he
chose to

perform a at t*.

But then we can say that I have now

committed myself by clause (ii) to buying a new car
last year, because

I

opportunity.

look into my past and think of an

action

If

I

would have done so if

I

that I did not perform but now wish

c

had had the

I

had

performed, I have committed myself to performing

because

I

would have performed

c

c,

if I had had the

opportunity.
If we look more closely at Brand's total set of

requisite actions we will uncover another flaw in his

definition of commitment.

He supplements his definition

with a definition of "requisite action".
An action, say b, is a requisit e a ction of person
S for

performing a

conditions,

S is

if

and only if, under the given

unable to perform a unless he

performs b.4
The example he gives is that a requisite action for

drinking orange juice is lifting the glass.
suppose

vie

Now

take as our total set of requisite actions

for drinking orange juice {swallowing, opening one's

mouth, and lifting the glassT-

•

Suppose

each of these actions, in that order.
order is wrong.

S

performs

Obviously the

But Brand mentioned nothing about

^This criticism was suggested to me by Fred Feldman.
^Brand,

_op

clt

,

pp. 90-1.
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order.

And this set is identical to the set
{^lifting

the glass, opening one's mouth,

b

wallowing

basis of the principle of extensionallty

on the

,

All he

.

specifies is that the set is believed to be
the "total
set".

Thus the agent, under (ibl-i), had done every-

thing he thought necessary for performing

a,

or drinking

orange juice, but none of the juice reached his
stomach.

Y.e

could patch up both clause (l) and clause

(il) by specifying that the total set of requisite

actions must be an ordered n-tuple of actions,, not
Just
any ordered n-tuple, but the ordered n-tuple of actions

that S believes is requisite for performing

drinking orange juice.

a,,

or

The agent could still be mis-

taken in his belief, but at least there must be some

semblance of sense to his belief.

Brand's definition of commitment can be modified
to avoid the criticism expressed above, that it commits
us to performing any action we wished we had performed,

by adding a time function.

So revised (Ibl) would

read as (Ibla):
(Ibla) For every person S and every action

a,

and

every time t, S at t commits himself to per-

forming & iff
(1)

there is an ordered n-tuple of auctions

rc x

,

Cp, c^

,

.

.

.

cn
y

such that at

performs each of the actions in

t,

S
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<Ci»

C2

c n).

,

and S at

Justifiably

t

believes that this ordered n- tuple of
action is the requisite ordered n- tuple
of actions for performing

or
(il) there is an ordered n— tuple of actions
sC l>

c 2-»

c

3 >•••»

c n7

such that at t S

would perform each of the actions in

<c l»

c 2»

c 3>

•

•

c n/

s

• »

'

If he bad the oppor-

tunity to perform them, and at

t S

Justifiably

believes that this ordered n-tuple of
actions is the requisite ordered n-tuple
of actions for performing a.

Presumably, Brand's definition of "requisite action"
can be modified to serve as a definition of "requisite

ordered n-tuple of actions".

So modified it would read

An ordered n-tuple of actions

<C]_,

c2

C3,...,

,

c^

is requisite for S's performing a if and only if

under the given conditions, S is unable to perform
a.

unless he performs < 02 ,

c

2,

c^,...,

c

n>

.

With these modifications in (ibl), Brand's theory
is capable of dealing with cases in which an agent

chooses at

t

to perform

willing to perform at

t,'

provided at

he is

a.

at t

,

if he has the opportunity,

l

,

t

all the actions he Justifiably believes are requisite

for performing a.

There is a further flaw in clause (il) of both
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(Ibl) and (ibla).

For the sake of simplicity, let us

consider an action b, that is identical with
the requisite
ordered n-tuple of actions for performing b.
And let
us suppose that an agent justifiably believes
that this
is the case.

Suppose this agent is committed to per-

forming b at

t;,

but does not do so.

Clause (i) would

then not apply.
On clause (ii) he is committed to performing b at
t_

if and only if he will do so if he has the opportunity
It is logically possible for him to have the oppor-

tunity to perform b at

t

and not believe that he has

the opportunity to do so, and, consequently

try to do so.

,

not even

Thus we have a counterexample to all

versions of clause (ii) we have discussed.
To remedy this defect we must add a clause to (ii)

stipulating that the agent believe that he has the
opportunity to perform the action in question at the
time was to have had the opportunity to have dene so.

We noted above that on Brand’s definition of
commitment one is not committed if he has not yet per-

formed every action in the requisite ordered n-tuple
of actions,

or if he's not such that he will do so if

he had the opportunity to do so and believes he has

the opportunity to do

s o.

But how can one choose principles or general

actions?

Suppose we have an agent,

C,

who has chosen
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to live a Christian life.

By (lb) C has committed

himself to living a Christian life.

Now

C

is a very conscientious person.

He Justi-

fiably believes that a certain ordered n-tuple of actions
is requisite for living a Christian life.

has as many member actions as
death.

But

C

C

This n-tuple

can perform up to his

is a conservative Christian who firmly

believes that one one has had a conversion experience
and has chosen to live a Christian life he is a Christian.
So long as he remains faithful he does not have to

make this choice again.

So he believes this choice was

made once and for all, say, twenty years ago.

Button Brand's definition of commitment he has not
committed himself to living a Christian life until he
is Just about to die,

for only then, on clause (i),

will he have completed the ordered n-tuple of actions
that he Justifiably believed was requisite for living
a Christian life.

And since

C

had not committed himself

to living a Christian life before his last moments,
then, by (T13) he had not chosen to live a Christian

life until then.

Can we appeal to clause (ii) to cover a case like
C's?

Remember, C is very conscientious

.

He has a

penchant for saying such things as, "Even our best is
not enough".

So up until he was on his deathbed he

had not believed he had the opportunity to perform them.

131

And only then

1 b he

committed by clause (li) to living
a Christian life until he is
on his deathbed.

Brand's theoiy will not allow the
choosing of any
action of this type. A person who
wants to choose to
live a moral life, to be a patriotic
citizen, to be a
good husband, or to be a good father,
will encounter
similar difficulties with this theory.

There are other difficulties with (lb)
besides the
concept of commitment.
Note that there
is no time

reference in clauses (i) - (ill).

He evidently relies

on the expression being defined, "S chose
to perform
at t", to provide this reference.
is terminal;

it is not a process.

He says that choice
But by clause (ii)

the agent's choosing to perform a is identical
with his

performing

x.

And by (iii) his performing x is iden-

tical with his committing himself to perform a which
in turn by (ibl) is identical with a set of actions
he performs, or would perform if given the opportunity.

So performing x appears to be a process which would

make choosing a process.

Brand might be able to avoid

this complication by eliminating the circularity in
(^bl

)

due to clause (ill).

to perform

a,

Then a person has chosen

if and only if he has satisfied certain

conditions

Clauses (iv) and (v) pose problems for their lack
of completeness.

Brand apparently holds that the agent
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need not be able to specify the alternatives he
believes
he has.

But how can he consider them if he cannot

specify them?

Clause (iv) is so vague that it does not

even include a reference to the action the agent is

choosing to perform.
S

Without such a reference to a,

might choose to perform a and not believe he is

capable of performing a.

Brand must make (iv) more

explicit with regard to the alternatives the agent

believes he has.
In clause (v) Brand specifies that the agent

prefer a to the alternatives.

But he does not refer

to any alternatives, yet S's preference is a two-place

asymmetrical relation that holds between two possible
courses of action.

If the agent is going to prefer

to perform a to some other action, there must be some

other action that he can specify.
I

might

sa.y

that at this moment I prefer to write

this paper rather than do anything else.

me what my options are, and

I

If you ask

say that it does not

matter what they are, I prefer to just write this
paper, we would be justified in asking whether this

was

a

genuine choice situation for me.
Sometimes we do express our preferences in this

way.

Then we usually do not even consider doing any-

thing else.

Perhaps our attitude might be more accurately

termed desire rather than preference.

But is this a
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genuine choice situation?

In a choice situation we

do consider doing something else.

And that something

else must be specifiable, and specified.

But is preference a necessary condition of
choice?
We noted above that Glasgow insists that
it is not.

Col ling wood outlines a type of choice, caprice,
and

insists the preference is not a necessary condition.
So we must strike clause (v).

Brand's theory is plagued with problems, but it
has given us much food for thought about the conditions
of choice.

We will pick up some of the loose ends in

this chapter and those of previous chapters in chapter

8.

Chapter 8
THE CONDITIONS OF CHOICE

We left some unfinished business in several
chanters

concerning the conditions under which one chooses.

At

several noints we have noted that the agent must
believe
that he has alternatives if he is to choose.
paper, Skinner s, attemnted a statement of

Only one

f

for alternatives.
terion in Chapter

criterion

a

We nointed out a defect in that cri-

Then we presented another criterion

5.

with the note that we would re-cons ider it in Chapter
W.

D.

Glasgow and P. H. Nowell-Smith engaged in

debate over whether deliberation was
of choosing.
4 and 6,

a

8.

a

necessary condition

We made reference to this debate in Chapters

but noted that a more complete treatment of the

role and nature of deliberation in choosing was needed.
In Chanter

2

we considered

cast choosing as nurnosive.

a

theorv of choice that

None of the other theories

we examined, except for one of Collingwood

Chapter A, made even

a

f

s

,

treated in

passing reference to the role of

purpose in choosing.

Glasgow and Nowell-Smith debated the role of preference in choosing.

Collingwood insisted that preference
134
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is not a necessary condition, while
Brand insisted that

i^ is.

A final statement on this is needed.

We devoted much suace in Charter 7 to
of Brand's concention of commitment.

a

consideration

Glasgow and Nowell-

Smith also discussed commitment, but disagreed
on its
role in choosing. We will consider each of these

items

in turn in this chapter.

ALTERNATIVES
In Chapter

5

we cited, and criticised, a definition

of "alternative” that was advanced by Skinner.

His def-

inition was:
Two or more courses of action are alternatives

when it is logically impossible for

a

person to

follow more than one of them at the same time.*
We noted that on this definition a logically imnos-

sible course of action could serve as an alternative.
At that time we also suggested this modification of the

definition.
(D-A2) Two or more courses of action are alternatives

for an agent if and only if it is physically

possible for him to carry out either one of
them, and he has the opportunity to carry out

4

*R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice", P. 464.
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either one of them, and it is
physically
impossible for him to follow more
than one
oi* them at the same
time.
Is

(

D-A2

)

adequate?

In our discussions in nre-

vious chapters we pointed out that as

a

condition of

choice, an agent only need believe that
two specific

courses of action are alternatives for him.

So (D-A2)

must spell out what an agent believes about
these
courses of action.
But physical possibility £er

s_e

is still too broad.

Dr. Roger Bannister was the first person to run
a mile

in less than four minutes.

But one half hour before his

record-breaking run he was in his dressing room, an area
too small in which to run.

He still had his street shoes

on his feet and was then incapable of running that fast.

Five minutes after his re cord -break ns feat he did not
1"

have the strength even to stand let alone run.
a

If we add

time function and stipulate that the ament must have

the capability as well as the opportunity and physical

possibility of pursuing each course of action, then we
will avoid some troublesome cases.
Sometimes when we are debating which course of action
to pursue another person will, in jest, suggest an additional
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course of action that is unrelated
to the other possibilities we are considering Our
resrose is usually
to dismiss it as irrelevant.
In order to be relevant
it must be a rival means of
resolving the dilemma that
confronts the agent at that time. So
(D-A2) can
be

modified to (D-A3).
(D-A3) For any time t and any person S,
two or

more rival courses of action are alternatives for S at t just when it is phys-

ically possible for
one of them at

t),

S'

to carry out either

and S has the capability

and the opportunity to carry out either
one of them at

_t,

and it is physically

impossible for S to carry out more than
one of them at

j:.

Changes in the physical condition of the agent will
not produce troublesome cases for (D-A3).

Changes in

the agent’s surroundings will also not provide grounds

for constructing undesirable cases.
The term "physically impossible" in the last con-

junct in (D-A3) could pose problems if we do not spell
out the courses of action sufficiently.
if a host is serving three guests coffee,

For example,
and there are
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four curs on the trey, "taking cun A”
would not be an
alternative to "taking cun B", for agent
S might not
find it physically imnossible for
him to take both A
and B. Yet there is a tacit assumntion
that

no one will

take more than one so that each might
have one.

In this

situation, taking into account this tacit
assumption,
courses of action that would be alternatives
should be

specified as "taking just cup A" and "taking
just cup B"
Then it would be physically impossible for S to take
just cup A and to take just cup B in this situation.

But what if the host holds out

Sunnose the tray

is

full.

a

tray of brownies?

We would want to allow S to

consider "taking just brownie A" in this situation as
well.

But he could also consider "taking just brownies

A and B" as an alternative.

Careful and appropriate

specification of the courses of action in Question will
avoid problems with (D-A3).

DELIBERATION
Some of the theories we considered in earlier chapters incorporated deliberation as a necessary condition
of choice.

Others excluded it.

strongest between W.

D.

The debate was the

Glasgow and P. H. Nowell-Smith,

with Glasgow holding that deliberation

is an

essential
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part of choosing.

Nowell-Smith argues that we do not always
engage in
full scale deliberation before we choose.

And he is right.

Sometimes there is very little time lag
between the moment we start to deliberate and the moment
when we choose
one of them.

In those situations there is barely
time to

deliberate.

He writes.

choosing does not always involve deliberation or

even having reasons for one’s choice, apart from
having

a

simple nreference.

Deciding, on the other

hand, is less hanpily divorced from deliberation.

A flipnant tyrant or bureacrat may decide

a

cause

off-hand; but we are concerned with ’resolve, make

up one’s mind’; and here there must surely be at
least some minimal deliberation (weighing up of

alternatives), not simple preference for one. 2

Remember that Nowell-Smith does not equate choosing

with deciding to do something but with doing-this-ratherthan-that.

Glasgow, who holds that choosing is deciding

to do this-rather-than-that

,

agrees with Nowell-Smith

that deciding renuires at least minimal deliberation.
He writes
In order, therefore, for us to say that an act was
2 P.

H. Nowell-Smith,

’’Choosing,

Deciding and Doing”, P. 6i.
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an act of choosing, there must be
awareness of alternatives as alternatives together
with a considering of these alternatives.
That is, there
must be at least minimal deliberation.
,

What would qualify as "a considering of
these al-

ternatives"?

Glasgow cites

a

situation as an example

of choosing without preference as part of his
argument

against Nowell-Smith that preference is not
essential to
choosing.
The agent is "asked to choose a card from
a
hand of cards held out to him (oresumably face
down)".

He

.

.

.

was aware that each card was

a

nossibilitv

of choice for him: he was free to take whichever
he wanted.

But he also saw that each card was

exactly like its neighbour, and that there was
therefore no reason why he should take one rather
than another.

He therefore made up his mind to

choose at random and this he did.

considered the alternatives.

.

.

In other words he
.

^

If the agent harrens to be very familiar wit

h

the

alternatives, merely identifying them, or recognizing
them, might suffice as minimal deliberation.

Upon i-

3w. D. Glasgow, "The Concent of Choosing", P. 64.

klbld .. P. 64.
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dentifying them he could proceed to choose.

In a situ-

ation in which he is not familiar with the
alternatives
we might expect the agent to engage in
more than minimal
deliberation. But must he? Sometimes we tell
others

that they made

a

bad choice, snecifving or implying that

they should have considered their alternatives
more

thoroughly.

Glasgow views minimal deliberation as an awareness
of the alternatives together with a considering
of them.

But with the case of minimal consideration just cited,

awareness of the alternatives as alternatives seems to
be all that we need.

Often we find situations in which an agent is aware
of several possible courses of action as his alternatives

but he follows one course of action without seriously con

sidering any of the others.
of choosing?

Are these cases instances

If thev are, Glasgow must concede that

Nowell-Smith is correct, and that deliberation
necessary condition of choice.

is

not a

"But the agent has made

up his mind without regard to the alternatives,” Glasgow could reply.

The existence of alternatives had no

bearing on the course of action the agent followed.
what bearing should they have?
them as alternatives.

But

The agent was aware of

As such he believed he could have
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followed any one of the other courses of
action if he
had so chosen. And isn’t that minimal
deliberation?

a

Gla sgow holds that choosing is deciding to
follow
particular course of action. And he stresses

that com-

mitment is

a

necessary condition of choosing.

But he

also insists that we must deliberate if we are
to choose.
Has he confused ’’deciding to” with "deciding that”?
He

could more easily argue that deliberation is

a

necessary

condition of "deciding thst”, for the object of ’’deciding
that” is a proposition.
is an action.

But the object of "deciding to”

We can safely agree with Nowell-Smith

that while we may deliberate in some cases of choosing,
we need not engage in full-blown deliberation in all
cases

But this move does not really resolve the difficulty.
The cases that would thus Qualify are ones in which the

agent in Quite familiar with the alternatives.

He had

considered them, or options very similar to them, on
previous occasions.

So his nuick identification

of

them

as ones he had previously considered, and his acting on

them without further deliberation, indicate that he is
relying on his previous deliberation to guide him.
Cases like these, however, will not suffice to es-

tablish Nowell-Smith’s position, for Glasgow can always
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appeal to the deliberation the agent had done
previously,
and justify these cases on those grounds.
Nowell-Smith
needs to make a more sophisticated attempt
than this.
Let us consider the way an agent would
deliberate
in a choice situation.

His deliberation would ideally

follow essentially this nattern.
(1)

I

will realize E.

(2) A is a means

of realizing E.

(3)

B is a means

of realizing E.

(4)

A and B are alternatives for me.

(5)

Shall

(6)

I

I

do A or shall I do B?

will do A.

This pattern of thinking wa

s

suggested to me by

Wilfrid Sellars’ work on -practical reasoning as outlined
in "Thought and Action". 5

Note that

I

did not call this

pattern of thought -practical reasoning.

None of these

lines are conclusions drawn from -previous ones.

And

remember that we are trying to set forth an unders tanding
of "consideration of alternatives", not

a

theory of prac-

tical reasoning.
To support my contention that (l)-(6) does not in-

volve any reasoning, let us look at each line.

Line (1)

^Wilfrid Sellars, ’’Thought and Action”, in Keith Lehrer,
ed.. Freedom and Determinism, (New York: Random House,
Pp. 105-141.
1966)
,
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expresses an end or purpose; line?
beliefs; line (5)

a

(

2 ),

nuestion; and line

(

(

3

6

)

Rn d

)

{

u)

an intention.

There are no inference? drawn here.

Some might point out that the move from
is

often accomplished by practical reasoning.

correct.

(

5

)

to

(

6

)

That is

Many instances of intentions expressed by sen-

tences such as line

(

6

are inferences drawn from reasoning

)

that follows the raising of a question such as expressed

by line (5).

If an agent engaged in practical reasoning,

such reasoning would be likely to occur at that noint in
this nattern.

But for choosing it is not necessary that

the agent engage in such reasoning.

Now

theory of practical reasoning should be pre-

a

pared to snell out the conditions under which one can

make such an inference.
here.

But this is not our concern

This paper is on choice, not practical reasoning.

And all we have to do is to spell out an understanding
of what it means to consider alternatives.

Line

(

6

)

expresses an intention.

culties in ^ollingwood

*s

We noted diffi-

and Skinner’s theories in

moving from an intention to an action.

A solution to

this problem is to utilize a distinction implicit in

Sellars* paper between
intention and

a

a

temporally indefinite occurrent

here and now occurrent intention.
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For Sellars, an intention is a shall-thought
and is
expressed by a s hall-statement . A shall-statement

is a

practical assertion of the form:
such and such shall be the case.
The form of a here and now occurrent intention
is

such and such shall now be the case.
Thus If line (6) expresses

a

temporally indefinite occur

rent intention, the corresponding here and now occurrent

intention would be expressed by
(7)

shall now do A.

I

Sellars notes that
There is an important similarity between learning
to make the language -entry transition of responding
to presented red objects by saying, "This is red,"'

and learning the language-departure transition,

which joins the saying of
I

shall now do A

and, consenuently , the though
I

with

a

shall now do A

doing of A.

Until

a

child has acouired this

connection, he has not learned the meaning of "I
shall now do A," and until he has learned this, he

cannot learn the full meaning of "shall", for all

other uses of "shall" owe their connection with
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action to their connection with this use
of ’’shall". 6
If S has an intention to do A in C and
has the a-

bility and the opportunity to do so, and
believes that he
is in C, then if he has no conflicting
or coraneting
in-

tentions, he will do A.

This accounts for the connection

of intentions and actions.

The connection between

a

here

and now occurrent intention and the appropriate
behavior
is causal.

The behavior is a response that is learned

when one learns the meaning of thoughts of the form
I

So, if a

will now do A
person has a succession of thoughts as

expressed by lines

(

1 —( 6
)

and one as expressed by (7),

we would expect the appropriate behavior to follow.

In

having these thoughts he would have been aware of the
alternatives as alternatives and wouldhsve considered
them in

a

minimal way.

This pattern should satisfy

Glasgow’s condition of minimal deliberation.
However, Nowell-Smith insists that one need not de-

liberate at all.

How can we accomodate this contention

with the view just outlined?
r

Aie view just outlined is idealized.

our thinking is fragmentary.
6 J.bld

Hut much of

Even our theoretical

1 disagree with Sellar's use of the
Pp. 108-109.
word 'shall' as opposed to 'will' in expressing intentions.
I will follow Collingwood and use 'will'.
. ,

14?

reasoning is frecuently fragmentary and
enthymematic
From such a ^remiss as
Socrates is a man,
we readily infer

Socrates

is

mortal.

Obviously, the missing premiss is
All men are mortal.

As an argument it is an enthymeme.
Our thoughts might occasionally be a fragmentary

version of (l)-(7), such as
will realize E,

(1)

I

(4)

A and B are alternatives for me.

(7)

I

will now do A.

But we might not even be conscious of a thought such as

that expressed by (1).

There are many goals and purposes

which we have over long periods of time even though we
are not always thinking of them.

And we sometimes act

to fulfill them without thinking about them.

Can we find a way to eliminate (4) and (7) and still

maintain that the agent is aware of his alternatives and
chooses intentionally?

The answer is

’yes'.

We can anneal to what Q.uine has called the "transi-

tivity of conditioning.

We noted above that one learns

to associate such thoughts as "I will now do A" with be7W

.

V. Quine, Word and Obj ect
P. 12
I960 .

Press

,

)

,

.

(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
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havior appropriate to doing A.

Such behavior may be re-

garded as a conditioned response to such
thoughts.
In a sufficiently sophisticated and
conditioned agent
the thought "I will now do A" is apt to be
skipped, and
what would otherwise prompt the thought, ”1
will now do
A” may prompt the behavior associated
with the thought—

namely the performance of A.

This is what is meant by

the transitivity of conditioning.

Now

a

person might be in

a

situation in which he i-

dentifies two ortions 8nd follows through on one of
them,

without being aware of any thoughts to that effect.

We

can justifiably claim that such a case is one of choosing
by appealling to the transitivity of conditioning and to
the enthymematic character of much of our thinking.

Thus

we can take the pattern of deliberation outlined above as

our understanding of minimal deliberation in an ideal

choosing situation.

Naturally we could engage in more

lengthy deliberation than that.
expressed by lines

(5)

Between the thoughts

and (6) an agent could weigh the

consenuences of A versus B, the costs and the benefits
of A versus B, etc.

He could engage in considerable

practical reasoning if he so desired.

Thus, with the

qualification that the agent’s deliberat ion might be
enthymematic or might omit steps through transitivity
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of conditioning, we conclude thst
deliberation is
sary condition of choosing.

a

neces-

PURPOSE
The pattern of deliberation outlined
above casts
choosing as purposive. There are two
fundamental Questions
we must deal with in this section. First,
is choosing

purposive?

Second, can we choose our purposes?

Most of

the theories we examined did not even mention
purposes

behind choice.

We examined the concent of an alternative above.

And we noted that sometimes for

a

narticular course of

action, an agent might have the Physical nossibility,

canability, and onoortunity of performing it, and it

might be physically impossible for him to perform

it and

some other courses of action at the same time, but that
he might reject it as an alternative because it is ir-

relevant to his concerns at the moment.

It was on these

grounds that we introduced the term ’rival’ into (D-A3).

When one considers doing A or doing 3, what is it
that brings him to consider A and B together?
he consider A and B instead of C and D?

Why does

Or A and C?

There is a relationship between these alternative courses
of action that brings the agent to consider them at the
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same time as alternatives.
If another person suggests a
possible course of action
for an agent to consider, and that
agent rejects it, he

could do so because it is not relevant
in the light of
his immediate and long range purposes,
or it is not a
means to realize his goals.

Some might point out that it is an agent’s
purposes
that determine which courses of action he will
consider
as alternatives.

But an agent will consider only those

courses of action that he believes are his alternatives.

And what factors affect his beliefs?

standard of acceptability
feelings at the moment.

,

Surely not some

such as would be based on his

Rather, he would believe that

action A is one of his alternatives at

t

only if he be-

lieved that A was a means of realizing purpose P which he

held at t.
The model of deliberation we advanced above was i-

dealized.

Only one purpose was stated.

But we usually

have several in mind explicitly or tacitly.
A may be

a

to purpose

Thus action

means of realizing purpose P; action B
Q,;

action

might see A, B, and

C a
C as

means to purpose R.
our alternatives.

choosing we would appeal to

a

and R to resolve our dilemma.
be not between A, B, and C,

a

means

And we
But in

purpose higher than

P,

Q,

Thus the choice would then

but between P, Q, and R,
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and it would be made on the basis of
realizing this higher
purpose

Another action, say

possible course of

a

D,

might be advanced as another

ction, but rejected because it is a

means of realizing only purpose S, one which
is not desired by that agent at that time.
It should be apparent by now that it is the
hierarchy
of purposes and goals we have that provide
the basis for

certain courses of action, or purposes, to be seen
as alternatives by an agent. The definition of alternatives
we advanced above,

(D-A3), expresses the exclusion as-

pect of alternative courses of action, but does not bring
out the positive foundation of their relationship.
If two courses of action cannot be alternatives for
a given agent unless they are means of realizing one or

more of his purposes (and satisfy D-A3), then any courses
of action he sees as alternatives, he sees and considers
as means of realizing one or more purposes.

The conse-

quence of this for choice is that choice must be purposive.
One cannot choose without considering alternatives.

And

one considers alternatives only within the light of his

purposes.

Thus choosing is purposive.

The second question we raised at the beginning of

this section was "Can we choose our purposes?"

If all
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choosing is purposive, then, if we
can choose purposes,
then there must be at least one
purpose we cannot choose.

Such

purpose would be a supreme purpose
or ultimate
purpose an agent's life. If we could
choose
a

it,

there must be some other ourpose it
serves as

a

of realizing, and it would then not
be supreme.

we cannot choose such

a

then

means

While

purpose, we can adopt it, or

acquire it in many other ways.
But what of our other purposes?

Can we choose them?

In the deliberation model we proposed, choosing
was cast
as purposive.
The purpose was expressed in line
as

(1)

I

will realize E,

But expressed in this form a purpose is itself an
intention.
It might be a generalized intention if E was, say, my hap-

piness,

If it is a temporally indefinite occurrent ini

tention, why couldn't there be a corresponding here and

now occurrect intention?
A problem arises at this point.

If this purpose

is not a supreme purpose of this agent,

to adopt it.

he

could choose

But what behavior would be appropriate for

such an intention?

The thought is too general for one

to learn behavior appropriate to it on that model.

And

yet if there is no behavior appropriate to that thought,

then it is not

a

here and now occurrent intention.

To be able to say that we can choose these purposes
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would require another model for deliberating
and choosing.
On our model, the object of choice is
a n action.
The key

to understanding the model we have outlined

is

we expect the agent to exhibit upon forming

a

occurrent intention.
expresses

a

the behavior
here and now

But if one forms an intention that

general purpose, what behavior can we exrect

him to exhibit?
Perhaps we can shed some light on this problem
if we
consider conditional choices. Often persons choose
to

peri orm

c

if ^ obtains.

Thus at step (7) they would form

a conditional intention.

What would qualify as behavior

appropriate to this intention?

I

suggest that it would

be that of reasoning in a certain way.

miss

He has the pre-

:

I

When he is in

will perform

c

if Q obtains.

situation where he believes Q obtains,

a

he would then reason:

Q obtains.

So

I

will perform

c

here and now.

We now have a here and now occurrent intention that

would result in overt behavior according to our model.
If the intention one forms

is

general, such as in

the case of a principle or purpose, we could expect him
to engage in deliberation like
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Shall

I

realize P or shall

I

will realize Q.

a

is a means

b is

Shall
I

I

realize T?

(choice of a purpose)

of realizing q,

means of realizing Q.

a
T

do

will do

a

or shall I do b?

a

Thus the behavior we would expect him to
exhibit in

choosing

a

trated.

Note that the first two lines in our illustration

purpose is that of reasoning in the way illus-

are only the last two lines of the deliberation
model we

set forth above.

So, on the groundwork we have laid, it

is possible for a person to choose principles and to
make

conditional choices as well as to choose to perform actions.

PREFERENCE

Nowell-Smith and Glasgow have another point of disagreement that they deal with while they argue the deliberation point.

Nowell-Smith insists that one need not

deliberate, but may merely nrefer one alternative to the
other.

"Choosing does not always involve deliberation

or even having reasons for one’s choice, apart from having
a

simple pref erence

^P.

."

H. Nowell-Smith,

"Choosing, Deciding and Doing”, P. 64.
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Glasgow disagrees, and a^ues that
^reference is
not a necessary condition of
choice.
He cites the cardchoice illustration we ouoted above as
an instance of
choice without preference. To support
Glasgow’s position
we could also appeal to a situation
in which the
agent

is confronted by two alternatives
he likes equally,

preference of the one chosen over the other
is

a

ment for choosing, then the agent cannot
choose.
stalemated.

if

requireHe is

Yet we do choose in situations like this.

The scales might be tinned in favor of the
one he chooses

bv some factor such as proximity.

Yet oroximity, like

nreference or any other sea le-tinniner factor,

is

not

necessary either.
The alternatives could be eoually preferable to the

agent and of eoual ease to carry out.

But no stalemate

need result simply because the agent is not being pushed

toward one of the alternatives.

The presence of these

factors would not constitute sufficient conditions for
choosing.

One can prefer one of several alternatives

but choose none of them.

,/hat

is

needed

is

some form

of commitment to one of the alternatives, expressed in
the agent’s intention to adopt it.

Bo we were justified

In agreeing with Glasgow «nd arguing against the in-

clusion of nreference as

a

necessarv condition of choice.
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COMMITMENT
In the last chapter we discussed
at length Myles

Brand’s conception of commitment.
his view was very narrow.

We noted then that

Only cases in which the agent

had actually performed the action or
would have performed
it if he had not been prevented from
doing so would qualify as cases of commitment for Brand. In
addition to
beirer narrow and excluding all but cases
of strong com-

mitment, Brand’s formulation can deal only with cases
in
the nest. With his theory we are unable to say
tte t

agent

is

some time

this

committed ri^ht now to rerforming action A at
_t

which

Both Glasgow

is
a

in the future.

nd Nowell-Smith speak of commitment,

and this is still another point at which they disagree.

Glasgow links commitment to deciding, whereas Nowell-

Smith ties it to choosing.
Glasgow does not incorporate any formal statement
of his conception of commitment in the text of either
of his papers mentioned earlier.

The only reference to

commitment he makes in the bodies of his carers

is

to

say that while ”to choose” means ”to decide to do”,

choosing emnhasizes consideration of alternatives whereas
deciding emrhasizes commitment.
We do get

a

glimpse into his conception of commit-
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ment in a footnote where he writes
But when

I

decide to do something, then it could

be said that I am prepared to do
it, and that I

will do it, if
to do it.

Whether

I

I

can, when the time comes for me

This is what I mean by commitment.

tell anyone of my decision is irrele-

vant, although if I do announce it,

more difficult for me to revoke it.

it may be

As Nowell-

Smith saw, there are degrees of commitment. 12

Glasgow notes that there degrees of commitment.
And our everyday speech would support this observation
as we often say that a person is strongly committed.

But

where in his statement of his understanding of commitment
is there room for

variation in the strength of commitment?

Perhaps alternative interpretations of the clause "if

I

can” might be one place we could make such adjustments.
If we were to try to insert an adverb before the verb

"prepared”, for example, "stronglv nrenared", would we
have solved the nroblem?

This latter aprroach poses

additional difficulties.

How does one determine that

another is "strongly pre oared" or "weakly prepared" to
perform an action?
The first suggestion appears to offer more fruitful
12 Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing", P.
65, note 2.
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possibilities.

The clause "if

I

can" can be Interpreted

as loosely and weakly as "if it is
convenient for me"or
"if I can fit it in".
It can also be

interpreted as

strongly as "if it is at all possible".

The fundamental

difference between these interpretations would
be embodied in how much the agent was willing to
do in order
to make it possible for him to perform that act
which he
was committed to perform.
Are we justified in extending the meaning of "if
I can"

this far?

Glasgow does not mention taking steps

to make it possible for him to perform that action.

only qualification that he states is "that

I

will do it,

if I can when the time comes for me to do it".

"if at all possible" is accentable as
"if I can".

a

The

Certainly

strong reading of

The agent would be giving highest nriority

to that particular action provided "possible" is not re-

stricted or qualified heavily.

The difference in priority

assigned by the same agent to the performance of different

actions will then serve as an indicator of relative strength,
or weakness, or his commitment to perform each of the actions
in question.

Two different criteria are being debated here.

One

will serve as the basis to determine whether the agent
is committed to nerforming a particular act.

The quotation

we are considering from Glasgow is supposed to perform
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this function.

The other will provide the means
by which

we can obtain an approximate measure
of the strength of
the agent's commitment to performing
that act. Glasgow
acknowledges that there are degrees of
commitment, but

does not provide us with the means to determine
or to
measure them. As we have noted, the one criterion
he
does suggest can be modified by nroviding
annronriate

interpretations for the clause "if

I

can."

Glasgow indicates that Nowell -Smith also saw that
there are decrees of commitment.

The nassage he cites

is from Nowell -Smith 's "Choosing,

Deciding and Doing".

I can

commit myself or become committed in two

main ways.

(a)

I

may have taken such steps as

to make a certain course of action inevitable or

more nearly inevitable than it was before.

Thus,

if I have bought a train ticket and have no more

money,

I

am now committed to going by train and

not by bus

(

if I go at all),

gage) mvself when I promise

even, perhaps, when
it.

But

a

I

(b) I commit (en-

to do something,

announce my decision to do

private, unannounced decision does not

commit me to anything.

If this account of com-

mitment is correct, it seems clear that when
choose (embark on a course of action)
often, commit myself.

I

I

I

do, very

am to some extent com-
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mitted when

I

book a room at an hotel, to

extent when

I

announce to my family that

a
I

less
have

chosen the Metronole, but not committed
at all
when I have merelv decided which hotel

to so to. 13

That last clause in this passage clearly
excludes

Glasgow’s conception of commitment from
qualifying as
part of Nowell -Smith’s criteria. The exclusion
of "mere
decisions" and the requirement that, at a minimum,
an

announcement must be made, bear further examination.

Who

or what would qualify as the one(s) to whom this
annouce-

ment must be made?

Must it be another human being?

If we insist that another human being be informed
of such decisions or promises in order for us to com-

mit ourselves, then

a

man such as Arthur Bremer was not

committed to killing George Wallace or Richard Nixon.

Bremer did shoot Wallace in Maryland.

He followed him

around the country, and he trailed Nixon to Canada.

At

one point he was so close to the President that he ap-

pears in one news photo with him.

Bremer had told no

one of his decisions to kill Wallace and Nixon.

Yet

even a casual reading of his diary will reveal that he

was very determined to do so.

It dominated his thinkin

and shaped his travel itinerary.
13 Nowell-Smith, Pp. 64-65.

But whom did he tell?
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Can we consider his diary as his
announcement of his
decisions? There was no communication. N
0 one heard him.
If we are to accept Bremer's case as
an instance of commitment on this criterion, then all one
need do is to talk
to himself. No one else has to hear the
announcement.
If Bremer's diary had not been found,
no one would have

known of his announcement.

But this is not an adequate

way to capture what Nowell -Smith considers
to be the
social character of commitment.
For Bremer’s case,

Glas-

gow’s concpetion of commitment is far more adeauate
than

criterion (b).

Nowell-Smith has two criteria.

Criterion

(a)

fares

no better than (b), for on (a), Bremer was not committed
to shooting Wallace until he squeezed the trigger.

Only

then was it "more nearly inevitable (that he was going to
shoot Wallace) than it was before".

All of his entries

in his diary and all of his travels across the country
in pursuit of Nixon and in pursuit of Wallace did not

make it inevitable, or more nearly inevitable, that

Bremer was going to shoot Nixon or Wallace.

He might

have merely stood in the crowds and watched in Maryland,
as he had in Canada.

Criterion
(b).

(a)

is more negative in its accroach than

The sense of "committed to cerform" for (a) is clo-
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ser to "had no choice but to
nerform" whereas the sense
of "committed to perform” for
(b) is closer to "determined to perform". Criterion (a)
carries with it not
merely the closing off of other courses
of action, but
of leaving the agent no choice but
to perform that particular action. Criterion (a) expresses
strong commitment but in a way in which the agent appears
to be

backing into the situation.

Brand’s criterion is a

more positive expression of strong commitment.

What is the fundamental sense of ”S is committed
to performing action A"?

perform action A”?
action A”?

delineate

is it "S is determined to

Is it ”S is prepared to perform

Neither Nowell-Smith nor Glasgow seek to
a

fundamental sense of the concept of com-

mitment that will serve as

a

unifier through the vari-

ations in the criteria needed to capture the different

degrees of commitment.

Glasgow does not encounter this

problem directly, for though he acknov/ledges that there
are degrees of commitment, he advances only one cri-

terion.

But Nowell-Smith advanced two.

Nowell-Smith states in a footnote that he has worked
out the relationship between (a) and (b) in Chapter
in his book Ethics.

14-

In that charter he focusses his

attention on obligation and its role in the determination
of the course of action of an agent.

But the connection
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between that discussion and the criteria
of commitment
we have been considering is not
apparent. Nowell-Smith
states explicitly that when a person
is obliged to do
something he would rather not do it. "A
moral obligation
is, like a natural obligation, something
which obliges
me to act in a way that, but for the
obligation, I

would not have acted. ,tlZ4>
In moral, as in the other cases, the logic
of

obligation requires

a

conflict between the obli-

gation to do something and the inclination not
to do it.

But it is important to notice that

this conflict is part of the general background
of obligation and need not occur in every case. 15

These two passages show that the concept of obli-

gation, as portrayed by Nowell-Smith, will not serve as
the foundation for linking (a) and (b), though he states

that it will.

In criterion (b) there is no conflict be-

tween an agent’s committing himself to performing an
action by deciding, or promising, to do it and his desire, or inclination, to do It.

tricate

a

Sometimes we can ex-

-promise from another when he is not inclined

to perform that action, but it is these cases that are

^P.

H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics
Inc., 1954), P. 210.

15

Ibid., Pp. 210-211.

.

(

Baltimore Penguin Books,
:

16^

the exceptions rather than the rule.

Normally there is

little conflict.
We have been interpreting (a) in

a

negative manner.

Nowell-Smith might object, for if one takes
such steps
as to make a course of action inevitable,
or more nearly
inevitable, hasn’t he done so intentionally?
Yes. But
if I am committed to nerforming action
A, I would take
steps to make it possible for me to nerform
action A.

would take such steps that would be necessary
for me
to perform action A. Now criterion (a) states
sufficient
I

conditions for me to be committed ti performing action
A,
but it is not necessary that (a) be that strong if I
am

also the one to perform the action in question.

Suppose

I

am committed to having another person per-

form action A.

would want, at
action A.

Then
a

(a)

would be more acceptable.

I

minimum, to have S promise to perform

But if

I

were strongly committed to having S

perform action A,

I

would take such stens as necessary

to make it inevitable.

Note that while we have been con-

sidering commitment only in the context of "I commit

myself to performing action A", this interpretation of
criterion

is permissible because Nowell-Smith is

(a)

presenting criteria for ”1 can commit myself or become
committed.

.

.

."

Even in criterion (b) when the agent

is the same one who will perform that action, Nowell-
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Smith still does not specify that to
which the agent commits himself.
We are not concerned here with the
concept of commitment j>er se, but with commitment as it
is related to
choice. Brand specifically places this
nualifi cation on
his definition.
Can one choose to have another person
perform a particular action? An army captain
might

choose to have his men charge

a

certain bunker, or a

judge might choose to have the defendant serve
one year
in prison.

But both of these cases can be rephrased so

that the captain chooses to attack the bunker and the

judge chooses to sentence the defendant to one year in

prison.

I

rephrased .

believe that all other cases can be similarly
If they can be, then (a) is needlessly strong.

If one is strongly committed to performing

a

parti-

cular action, then he will perform it if he has the op-

portunity to do so.

The strength of his commitment

could be measured by what he is willing to do to bring

about this opportunity.
(a»)

Thus we could modify (a) to (a»).

For any person S, any action a, S is stongly

committed to performing a if and only if
(1)

S performs a if he has the opportunity

to perform a, and
(2)

S takes steps to bring about the op-

portunity to perform a.
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The difficulty with criteria for measuring
strong

commitment is that as we add conditions to
guage strength,
we shift the locus of the measurement problem
rather than
solve it.
Condition (2) specifies that "S takes steps.
.
Do we mean that S takes every step that is
necessary to

bring about this opportunity?

necessary step but one?
step but one?

What if S takes every

What if he takes every reasonable

What if he takes every step we could rea-

sonably expect him to take?

If we modify the criterion

in this way, we need a supplementary definition for

"reasonable".

A gain we have not solved the problem, but

merely moved its locus.
In our discussion of criteria (a) and (b) we have

taken Nowell-Smith

1

s

word that they represent different

degrees of commitment.

He insists that one is less com-

mitted when he has made and announced a decision, or
made a promise, than when he has taken such steps as to
make a certain course of action inevitable.

But what if

agent S announces his decision to perform action

A,

and

then takes such steps as to make his performance of A

Inevitable?

On Nowell -Smith’s view the agent’s commit-

ment to performing A increases in strength from the point
at which he made his announcement to the point at which
he has taken such steps as to make his performance of A

inevitable.

However, agent S might object and point out

i6y

that his commitment to performing A was
just as strong
when he announced his decision to
perform A as it was
after he had taken those steps. He could
maintain that
it was because he was so committed to
performing A that
he took those steps to make his performance
of A inevitable.

Nowell-Smith anrarently bases his contention that
the agent’s commitment is treater after he has
taken

those stern than before on the decrease in options a-

veilable to the agent and the increased probability
that the agent will be unable to change his mind or

break his promise.

The agent, on the other hand, is

appealling to his intention to perform A, which remains
the same from his announcement of his decision to per-

form A, through the steps he takes to make it inevitable,
to hisperf ormance of a.

How do we adjudicate between

these different approaches?
It should be apparent by now that there are two dif-

ferent tyres of criteria for commitment that are being
advanced.

And the distinction of strong/weak can be

applied to both tyres.

The tyre advanced by Brand and

by Mowell-^>mith in (a) is based on conditions external
to the agent.

We noted that Brand’s is very narrow, even

to the point of denying that one is committed if he has

not yet nerformed the action he is supposedly committed

.

IV 1
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performing.

Nowell -Smith’s

is

slightly looser.

But the

general sense of this type of commitment is
that of constraint.
The other type is based on the agent’s
intention to

perform the action.
curately.

It is more difficult to measure ac-

The general sense of this type of commitment

is that of determination.

As we noted above,

it is

dos-

sible to be strongly committed in one sense and weakly

committed in the other sense.

Both senses are imnortant

and relevant for choosing.
The intentional type of commitment can be either

specific or general in its relation to actions.

0 ne

may be committed to performing a specific action in that
he has formed a conditional intention, such as
\

I

will do A if W obtains.

Or, he may have formed an intention such as
I

where t

is

will do A at time t,

some time in the future.

When one’s commitment

is general,

there is no specific

action that is the object of the Intention.
ation model, each of the agent's alternatives
a

In our delibis

seen as

means of realizing another more general puruose,

When

we find a general intention that does not serve as a means
of realizing another purpose, we have an instance of the

169

supreme general purposes we spoke about above.
The two types of commitment, the
intentional and the

non- intentional

,

both function in choosing.

When one

is

deliberating, and has formed his intention
to perform a
certain action, but has not yet formed the
here and now
occurrent intention to do so, he is committed
intentionally.
As he carries out his intent in action,
he becomes committed
in the non-in tentional sense as well.

This is particularly

apparent when he must perform some preliminary
activity
in order to perform that action which he has chosen*
It is important for us to note, however,

that without

the intentional type of commitment, the agent cannot be

said to have chose.

The behavior he exhibits may show

non-intentional commitment and yet be unintentional.

On

our view of intention, commitment, and deliberation, an

agent cannot unintentionally choose to do somethin.
At many points in this chapter we have given more

than intimations of the shape of the theory of choice to
be presented in the next chapter.

Indeed, this chapter

was intended to straighten out some of the difficulties

concerning the conditions of choice, and thus pave the
way for that theory.

theory in full.

It is now time to lay out that

Chapter 9
THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE

—A

PROPOSAL

In our analysis of other theories, it became
appar-

ent that choosing to perform A is related in
some sense
to the perfomance of A.

The problem is specifying pre-

cisely the relationship between choosing to perform A
and oerforming A.

sing as an action.

Some theories we examined cast chooOne version cast "choosing to -per-

form A" as "performing A-rather-than-B" .

Another cast

choosing to perform A as an action that, once we wended
our way through the comnlexities of the theory, turned
out to be the very action that was chosen.

The problems

we encountered with these theories were of the type

dealt with in the previous chapter.

Another tack was to portray choosing to perform A
as deciding to perform A under various conditions.

The

difficulty with this approach was that the choosing was
incomplete until the action chosen was actually nerformed.

Nowell-Smith recognized this problem and cast choosing
as basically an action, but advanced a derivative formu-

lation for choices made regarding actions to be performed
in the future.

Nowell-Smith, Evans and Glasgow debated about the

standard sense of "choose".
170

Each pointed to conditions
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that he considered necessary for choosing and
indicated
variants which incorporated additional
conditions. We
are not going to try to argue for a
standard sense
of

choosing”.

Rather, we will avoid this debate by out-

lining an idealized model for choosing and show
that many
of our choosings are but fragmentary versions
of that
model.

We will show that viable theories previously

examined will fit this model in some way.
In chapter 8 we outlined our view of the relation

between thought and action.

We learn the meaning of

”S chooses to perform A now” by associating thoughts

like this with the appropriate behavior.

We understand

other types of choosing (condition choice, choice of
principles, etc.) in the light of our initial under-

standing of "S chooses to perform A now.
So we will outline a theory for ”S chooses to per-

form A at t” where the choosing and performing both take
place at

jt

,

and we will indicate the ad.iustments to be

made for other cases.
First, we will give our model for deliberation in
a

choosing situation.
(D14)

In any choosing situation, for any agent S,

any purpose P of S's, S deliberates about

how to realize P if and only if
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(a) S»s

thoughts follow this pattern:

will realize P.

(1)

I

(2)

A is a means of realizing P.

(3) B
(lv

)

(5)

is a means of

realizing P.

A and B are alternatives for me.

Shall

I

nerform A or shall

I

perform B?
(6)

I

will nerform A.
or

(b) S f s

thoughts are enthymematically re-

lated in form to (a).
In Chapter 8 we pointed out how our theoretical rea-

soning is often enthymemat ic .

And we stated that a suf-

ficiently sophisticated agent is ant to omit many of the
stems in the model we nresented then, which is the same
as that nresented

in (a) above.

These omissions are ex-

plained by the transitivity of conditioning, ana these
cases are thus iustifiably considered as instances of

deliberation on this model.
The same is true of deliberation.

commonly fragmentary.

This,

too,

is

We may not even have a clearly

conceived and specifiable purpose.

Some might object

that such cas^s are simply not in accord with our model.
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But this objection is not decisive, since
we can understand and justify the fragmentary cases
only be treating
them as if more of the idealized nattern were
there.

if we ask

a

Thus,

person to spell out more completely what
he

did and why, he would give us an account that
would be

recognizable as at least a fragment of this
idealized
model
We should note that on (DU) there is no
inference

drawn.

None of the lines need be conclusions drawn from

previous lines.

Thus, while choosing on our model is

purposive, it can be capricious.

A person could engage

in practical reasoning between lines

(

5

)

and

(

6 ),

but

need not do so, even to follow this idealized model.
The theory of choice that emerges from our examination
of this concept we will label (TU).

(TU)

For any person S, any action A, any time t,

where t is now or in the past, S chooses to

perform A at t if and only if there

is a

P

such that
(1) At t P is a purpose of S’s,
(2)

At t S deliberates about how to realize P,

and
(3)

(a)

As a result of his deliberating about

how to realize P, S forms the intention
at t
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I

will now perform A
exhibits the behavior appropriate

find S

to this intention if he is capable,

or

By virtue of the transitivitv of con-

(b)

ditioning, S proceeds at

t

directly

from deliberating to exhibiting behavior

appropriate to the intention
I

will now perform A.

As we have noted,

sometimes we choose now to perform

an action some time in the future.

suffice for these cases.

But (T1A) will not

So we need a statement of (T14)

sufficiently qualified to enable us to consider these
instances as cases of choosing.
(T14a) For any person S, any action A, any time t,

and any time t' after t, S chooses at t to

perform A at t* if and only if there

is a

P such that
(1)

At t t P is a purpose of S s,

(2)

At t, S deliberates about how to

f

realize P,
As a result of his deliberating about

(3)

how to realize P, S forms the intention at £
I

will do A at t»
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If t' has not yet occurred, we cannot
expect S to

have exhibited behavior appropriate
to this intention.
If S does not chance his mind between
t and _t*, then we
expect him to behave in this way;
(

a

)

at

jt

f

,

S reasons

It is now t/

will now do A,

I

and S exhibits the appropriate behavior if he
is capable,

or
(b)

at t

1
,

S exhibits behavior appropriate to the

intention
I

will now do A.

We will need to employ
fcr

(TU).

(

D1A) for (T14a)

as well as

(TUa) will do for those cases of choosing

when the action chosen

is to be

Performed at some time

after it is chosen, and for those cases of choosing
where the performance of the action is conditional upon
the realization of a particular state of affairs.

Some-

times we make statements or have thoughts of the form
I

will do B if R obtains.

Now R might never obtain.

But this type of intending is

allowable as an instance of choosing under (T14&), pro-

vided the other conditions are fulfilled, for time t'
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can then be understood as that time when the
state of
affairs R obtains.
We can use (T14) for cases where a
person chooses
to adopt a purpose.

Two changes must be made in (D14)

to cover these cases.

First, line (5) should read

(5') Shall I adopt A or shall I adopt B?

Second, line (6) should read:
(6*)

I

will adopt A.

Similar modifications must be made in (3a) and (3b)
of
(T14), keeping in mind that in the definiendum A is now

to be considered a nurpose, and that S is choosing to

adopt A.
The behavior aporooriate to an intention such as
I

will now adopt purpose P

is reasoning in patterns similar to that advanced in

(D14).
(T14)

includes the provision for the agent's belief

that he has specific alternatives.

These alternatives

are directly related to the agent's intentions, and ir-

relevant possible actions are thereby excluded as alternatives.

Thus (T14)

encountered in Chanter

is not subject to problems we
3

with Evans' theory were any

object would qualify as an alternative, whether the a-

gent believed it was one of his alternatives or not.
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This theory provides for the agent’s
deliberation
and his intentional performance of the
action chosen,

or for other appropriate behavior if the
object of choice
l

is not an action.

And his performance of this action

a direct result of his deliberation.

is

Theories which

based choosing on taking an object fell prey to the
ob-

jection that

a

person could unintentionally or accidentally

take one from among several objects he believed were his

alternatives and thereby choose it.

If the object of

choice is an object, one can choose it, on the basis
(T14), by choosing to take it.

of

Theories which based

choosing on deciding failed to snell out what behavior
we could expect from the one who had chosen and what re-

lationship obtained between the choosing and the appropriate behavior.

(T14) avoids all these problems.

With built-in adjustments for conditional and "coldstorage” choices, this theory avoids difficulties encountered by theories which require that the appropriate be-

havior expected from an agent be an action, such as
taking an object.

These adjustments also raved the way

for us to srell out how we can choose purposes.
(T14)

casts choosing as purposive.

ject and point to Collingwood

Chapter 4.

’

s

Some might ob-

theory considered in

But that theory expresses capricious choice.

U
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And to choose capriciously does not mean to choose
without
regard to a purpose. It means that the choosing
is not
the result of practical reasoning.

(

T1A) enables one to

choose capriciously or to choose as a result of his
practical reasoning.

So this theory avoids the pitfalls of

the other theories examined, ard
we have found to be necessary.

includes the provisions
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